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Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a 
Model for Breaking Up the Banks That Are 
Too-Big-to-Fail? 
Roberta S. Karmel* 
During the financial crisis of 2007–08 and the debates on regulatory reform that followed, 
there was general agreement that the “too-big-to-fail” principle creates unacceptable 
moral hazard. Policy makers divided, however, on the solutions to this problem. Some 
argued that the banking behemoths in the United States should be broken up. Others 
argued that dismantling the big banks would be bad policy because these banks would 
not be able to compete with universal banks in the global capital markets, and in any 
event, breaking up the banks would be impossible as a practical matter. Therefore, better 
regulation was the right solution. This approach was generally followed in the financial 
reform legislation that was passed.  
In the past, the United States has taken a variety of approaches to reining in banks. These 
include capital constraints, geographical restrictions, activities restrictions and conflict of 
interest restrictions. The primary techniques for reining in big banks recently enacted by 
Congress were increasing capital requirements, walling off proprietary trading and/or 
derivatives trading from commercial banking, and creating a resolution regime for failed 
financial institutions. 
One approach that has not been tried or even seriously discussed with regard to the big 
banks is the approach that was used to break up the utility pyramids created during the 
1920s, that is the antitrust approach utilized in the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
of 1935. This targeted and highly effective regulatory framework empowered the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to dismantle and simplify the corporate structures 
of the utilities without destroying them. This Article argues that this approach should be 
considered as a solution to the too-big-to-fail problem since it combines deconcentration, 
capital limits, activities restrictions and conflict of interest restrictions as an alternative to 
antitrust regulation, outside of adversarial prosecutorial case development. 
 
 * Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor and Co-Director of the Dennis J. Block Center for 
the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She is a former Commissioner of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. The research assistance of Brooklyn Law School students 
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summer research grant from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance in writing this Article. 
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Introduction 
During the financial crisis of 2007–08 and the debates on regulatory 
reform that followed, there was general agreement that the “too-big-to-
fail” principle creates unacceptable moral hazard. This principle is based 
on the belief that “certain institutions are so large or so complex that the 
government will intervene and prevent their failure by protecting 
uninsured creditors from their losses due to the perceived systemic risk 
presented by the organization’s failure.”1 Policymakers divided, however, 
on the solution to this problem. Some argued that the banking 
behemoths in the United States should be broken up. Others argued that 
dismantling the big banks would be bad policy, because these banks 
would not be able to compete with universal banks in the global capital 
markets, and in any event, breaking up the banks would be impossible as 
a practical matter. Instead, better regulation was the right solution.2 The 
key policymakers in the Obama administration believed in better 
regulation rather than in breaking up the banks. Therefore, an improved 
 
 1. Yomarie Silva, The “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine and the Credit Crisis, 28 Rev. Banking & Fin. 
L. 1, 115–16 (2009). 
 2. David Wessel, The “Too Big” Divide on Banks, Wall St. J., June 10, 2010, at A2. 
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regulatory approach was generally followed in the Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) passed by 
Congress.3 Yet, voices in favor of a return to the wall between 
commercial and investment banking of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 
(“Glass-Steagall”),4 or using some other technique for curtailing risky 
bank activities, continue to be heard and studied. Thus, further inquiry 
concerning the question of whether the big financial institutions should 
be curtailed remains relevant. 
Financial intermediation transforms savings into investments, prices 
and adds liquidity to those investments, and spreads financial risk. At 
one time, financial institutions engaged in these tasks were segmented. 
Commercial banks accepted deposits, both demand and time, and made 
commercial and personal loans and acted as underwriters of U.S. 
government and municipal debt. They also engaged in a variety of 
permitted ancillary services, such as estate and trust services and the 
advising of trust accounts, acceptances and letters of credit, and 
management of the payments system.5 Savings and loan associations 
(“S&Ls”) or thrifts accepted savings deposits and were engaged in 
extending mortgage loans.6 Broker-dealers and investment banks acted 
as underwriters for corporate and municipal issuers, advised customers 
on securities purchases, mergers and acquisitions and other transactions, 
and acted as agents and dealers in securities.7 There were no financial 
futures or dealing in derivatives until 1975;8 commodities trading was 
 
 3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
 4. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)), 
repealed in part by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 5. Commercial banks have continuously engaged in these kinds of activities, as well as some 
securities activities, depending on the legislative and economic climate at the time. See Thomas G. 
Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 
51 Tenn. L. Rev. 467, 468–69 (1984). As Congress eased restrictions on commercial banks, it sought to 
allow commercial banks to operate on an even footing with investment banks, particularly with regard 
to underwriting activities. Christian A. Johnson, Holding Credit Hostage for Underwriting Ransom: 
Rethinking Bank Antitying Rules, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 157, 159–60, 167–69 (2002); see also United States 
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326–27 n.5 (1963) (noting the principal banking products for 
commercial banks). 
 6. See James Ring Adams, The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal 21–22 (Karl Weber ed., 1990); 
see also Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Fail—Too Small to Compete: Systematic Risk Should Be 
Addressed Through Antitrust Law but Such a Solution Will Only Work If It Is Applied on an 
International Basis, 22 Fla. J. Int’l L. 31, 36–38 (2010). The restrictions on S&Ls were lifted by 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73, § 208, 
103 Stat. 193, 211 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2006)). 
 7. See Samuel L. Hayes III & Philip M. Hubbard, Investment Banking: The Tale of Three 
Cities 68–69, 98–112 (1990). 
 8. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized 
Financial Regulatory Structure 46 (2008) [hereinafter Blueprint] (“In 1975, the [Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission], with its new authority over futures markets, approved the first futures 
contracts on financial assets, including the Chicago Board of Trade’s futures contract on Government 
National Mortgage Association certificates, and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s futures contract 
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confined to agricultural futures traded on exchanges.9 Investment 
management was a shared activity among insurance companies, mutual 
funds, and individually advised clients. 
Because financial intermediation was reasonably separated, and 
because the United States regulated banking, securities issuances, and 
insurance on a state level before federal regulation of financial firms 
came into existence, the United States developed functional regulation of 
financial institutions and products. Functional regulation led to the 
creation of numerous financial regulators, each with a stake in 
maintaining such regulation.10 Regulated industries also had a stake in 
functional regulation.11 
This regulatory system was challenged by a number of economic 
and technological developments, starting in the 1960s, accelerating in the 
1980s, and coming to a crashing conclusion in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. Because President Nixon did not want to devalue 
the dollar during the first oil shock, fixed exchange rates were abandoned 
for a floating exchange rate system.12 Nevertheless, inflation inevitably 
eroded the value of the dollar and also the fixed interest rate ceilings that 
had supported the profitability of commercial banking.13 The invention 
 
on 90-day U.S. Treasury bills.”). 
 9. See Blueprint, supra note 8, at 11. 
 10. The United States has had a system of functional regulation with numerous federal and state 
regulators for financial organizations, whereas other countries have a single regulator of twin- or 
three-peaks regulation. See id. at 139–44. The head of the trade group for the securities industry urged 
a three-peaks solution to the U.S. regulatory order when financial reform was under consideration in 
2008. See Regulatory Restructuring and Reform of the Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 51–54 (2008) (statement of T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., President & Chief Exec. 
Officer of the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n). 
 11. The theory that regulatory competition resulted in regulatory efficiency justified the 
deregulation that prevailed from 1980 to 2008. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A 
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2385, 2394 (1998); Shelley Thompson, 
The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on Investor Protection, 41 Int’l Law. 1121, 1123 
(2007). Some scholars demurred. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities 
Law: A Dream (That Should Be) Deferred, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 1155, 1156–57 (2005). This theory was one 
of the factors that enabled regulatory industries to capture the congressional committees that had 
oversight over the federal financial agencies, not only through the mechanism of campaign 
contributions, but ideologically. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street 
Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown 92–97 (2010). 
 12. Deficits due to the Vietnam War as well as the rising power of OPEC contributed to a dollar 
devaluation and currency instabilities. See Henry Kaufman, Interest Rates, the Markets, and the 
New Financial World 87–88, 93–94, 189 (1986). During the 1970s and early 1980s, a number of large 
corporate and bank failures threatened the financial system and should have served as an early 
warning of problems within the U.S. and international financial regulatory systems. See id. at 5, 94. 
Bailouts of Chrysler and Continental Illinois Bank (“Continental Illinois”) led to the too-big-to-fail 
doctrine. See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
 13. Until 1980, the rate of interest that depository institutions could pay on deposits was fixed. 
Beginning in 1980, interest rate limitations were eliminated, and by 1986, they were completely 
removed. See 12 U.S.C. § 3501–09 (Supp. V 1980), repealed by Depository Institutions Deregulation 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 142. The connection between interest rate deregulation and 
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and growth of financial derivatives was one reaction to the unfixing of 
exchange rates. The instability injected into the financial system 
transformed financial intermediation from a business that turned savings 
into investments and then packaged those investments into loans and 
liquid securities, to a business that priced and traded risks. A tremendous 
growth in the amount of savings under private management led to the 
divorce of savers from investment decisionmaking14 and gave institutional 
investors great power over investment banks and securities exchanges. 
This power, coupled with technological advances, led to the unfixing of 
stock exchange commission rates that had supported the profitability of 
securities firms. Financial intermediaries profit from inefficiencies and 
anomalies in the process of intermediation. Computerization of financial 
services greatly reduced the costs of intermediation, with respect to 
banking and investment banking services and securities trading, and 
banks and securities firms were no longer protected by government-
sanctioned price fixing for their services. 
Changes in the American and global economies also threatened the 
U.S. financial regulatory model. Although the dollar remained the 
reserve currency, it began to be challenged by the Euro and other 
currencies. Also, commodity prices, especially oil and real estate, became 
significant measures of valuation. The U.S. budget and trade deficits and 
a floating rate currency regime injected risks into the financial system 
that contributed to the growth and further development of financial 
futures. By the late 1980s, derivatives had become the pricing mechanism 
for securities trading. This became apparent at the time of the stock 
market crash of 1987.15 The dominance of derivatives injected further 
leverage and speculation into the capital markets, completely 
undermining the margin rules passed in the 1930s to limit leverage and 
speculation in the securities markets.16 It also became apparent that in 
view of the changes in financial intermediation, old fashioned banking, 
investment banking, and securities trading were no longer viable. 
Further, the United States was overbanked. Thousands of banks and 
securities firms failed due to the combination of global competition, the 
financial firms’ inability to compete in the changed world of competitive 
 
further bank deregulation is drawn in Taking Account: Banking Deregulation Benefits Many People 
but Stirs Some Worry, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 1. 
 14. See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment 
Management Treatises, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 564–65 (1981) (reviewing Tamar Frankel, The 
Regulation of Money Managers (1980) and Harvey E. Bines, The Law of Investment 
Management (1978)). 
 15. See Presidential Task Force on Mkt. Mechanisms, Report of The Presidential Task 
Force on Market Mechanisms, at vi (1988); see also Div. of Mkt. Regulation, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 
The October 1987 Market Break, at 3-6 to 3-9 (1988) [hereinafter 1987 Market Break]. 
 16. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of the Securities and Exchange Commission as a Market 
Regulator, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 501, 516–17 (2009).  
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interest and commission rates, and the efficiencies wrought by 
computerization of financial intermediation and global competition. 
Because of the existence of deposit insurance and the need to protect the 
deposit insurance fund of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”),17 regulators were incentivized to prevent financial institutions’ 
failures. As a result, the too-big-to-fail doctrine developed in the 1980s: 
Mega-banks and financial supermarkets came into existence, because 
apparently sound institutions were willing to acquire failing institutions, 
especially if they could thus avoid regulatory restrictions.18 Banks pushed 
to get into securities trading and investment banking, and securities firms 
pushed to get into banking. Their regulators, Congress and the courts, all 
participated in dismantling the regulatory system that had held these 
businesses in separate compartments, but did not put any new regulatory 
system in place. Dodd-Frank also does not put any new regulatory 
system in place, but rather attempts to modify and reform the existing 
system. Moreover, this legislation gives expanded authority to the same 
regulators who failed to prevent the crisis of 2008. Furthermore, these 
regulators are now confronted by financial institutions that are 
behemoths and are extremely difficult to regulate or even to understand. 
Yet, they exert great economic and political power. 
In the past, the United States has taken a variety of approaches to 
reining in banks. These include capital constraints, geographical 
restrictions, activities restrictions, and conflict of interest restrictions.19 
None of these restrictions were able to withstand the end of the Bretton 
Woods Agreement, the unfixing of interest rate restrictions for banks 
and stock exchange fixed commissions, the invention of financial futures, 
the globalization of the capital markets, and perhaps most importantly, 
computerization of financial information. Furthermore, as Congress 
engaged in the deregulation of banking, from approximately 1980 to 
 
 17. Federal deposit insurance was created in 1933 as a result of the numerous bank failures after 
the 1929 stock market crash. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, ch. 89, sec. 8, § 12B, 48 
Stat. 168 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 263 (2006)). 
 18. When there was a run on Continental Illinois after the failure of Penn Square Bank (“Penn 
Square”) because Continental Illinois had purchased $1 billion in oil and gas exploration loans from 
Penn Square, the FDIC committed $4.5 billion from its insurance fund, and the Fed agreed to lend the 
bank an additional $3.6 billion. Laurie S. Goodman & Sherrill Shaffer, The Economics of Deposit 
Insurance: A Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms, 2 Yale J. on Reg. 145, 151 n.31 (1984). The 
FDIC was unable to find a merger partner, and so it announced it would purchase problem loans from 
the bank. Id. The FDIC then made a finding of “essentiality” and provided a $2 billion subordinated 
loan to the bank, becoming an 80% owner. Tim Carrington, U.S. Won’t Let 11 Biggest Banks in Nation 
Fail—Testimony by Comptroller at House Hearing Is First Policy Acknowledgment, Wall St. J., Sept. 
20, 1984, at 2. New managers and directors were then appointed. Id. In connection with these events, 
the Comptroller of the Currency told Congress that the federal government would not “allow any of 
the nation’s 11 largest banks to fail.” Id. Committee members retorted that he had created a new 
category of bank—the too-big-to-fail bank. Id. 
 19. See infra Part I. 
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1999, culminating in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“Gramm-Leach-
Bliley”),20 it did not create a new regulatory regime for banking, 
investment banking, and securities and commodities trading.21 
Additionally, due to Dodd-Frank, functional regulation remains, enabling 
different agencies with different approaches to continue regulating 
financial institutions and markets. The largest financial institutions have 
grown even larger than before, increasing the risks and costs of their 
failure. While some in Congress believe they have outlawed too-big-to-
fail, the size and connectivity of the largest financial institutions probably 
make this a vain hope. 
The primary techniques for reining in big banks considered by 
Congress or financial regulators in current regulatory reform efforts 
include increasing capital requirements,22 taxing financial transactions,23 
and walling off proprietary trading and/or derivatives trading from 
commercial banking.24 In addition, the Dodd-Frank legislation puts into 
place a resolution regime for failed financial institutions.25 Increased 
capital requirements will undoubtedly be imposed, not only in the 
United States, but globally.26 Some activities restrictions may also survive 
as regulatory options, but derivatives trading is being dealt with primarily 
through increased regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”), and the extent to which this new regulation will 
dampen derivatives trading is uncertain. 
One approach that has not been tried or even seriously discussed 
with regard to the big banks is the approach that was used to break up 
the utility pyramids created during the 1920s: that is, the antitrust 
approach utilized in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
(“PUHCA”).27 This targeted and highly effective regulatory framework 
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to dismantle 
and simplify the corporate structures of the utilities without destroying 
them. This program was so successful that even after it was essentially 
completed, the statute and SEC regulation of utilities remained on the 
books until quite recently. This Article will argue that this approach 
 
 20. Also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.). 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 23. This idea collapsed before it was even fully developed. See Francesco Guerrera et al., A Line 
Is Drawn, Fin. Times, July 1, 2010, at 9. 
 24. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 25. Tit. VII, 124 Stat. at 1641–1802. 
 26. See Damian Paletta & David Enrich, Banks Get New Restraints Historic: Refashioning of 
Rules Aims to Trim Risk-Taking, Limit Future Crises, Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 2010, at A1; see also 
Declaration, G-20, Toronto Summit 16 (June 26–27, 2010), available at www.g20.org/Documents/ 
g-20_declaration_en.pdf. 
 27. Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79 to 79(z)-6 (2000)), repealed 
by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 (2005). 
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should be considered as a solution to the too-big-to-fail policy, because it 
combines deconcentration, capital limits, activities restrictions, and 
conflict of interest restrictions as an alternative to antitrust regulation, 
outside of adversarial prosecutorial case development. Although some 
antitrust actions aimed at breaking up monopoly power have succeeded 
in restructuring an industry,28 other actions have failed,29 and the 
Department of Justice has not been especially successful in prosecuting 
cases against the banking and securities industries.30 
Part I of this Article will summarize the demise of geographical and 
activities restrictions on U.S. banks that culminated in the enactment of 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999. This Part will also explain why a return to 
Glass-Steagall is a nice idea but impractical if not impossible. Among 
other reasons, securitization has turned all commercial banks into 
securities firms, and the largest investment banks have become bank 
holding companies. Part II will set forth how deregulation of banking, 
against the backdrop of the continuing failure of banks and thrifts, 
contributed to the growth of large financial supermarkets. Part III will 
explore the extent to which the PUHCA is a possible model for dealing 
with the excesses of the mega-financial institutions. The Article will then 
conclude. 
In a global capital market economy, the United States is not as free 
as it once was to go its own way in financial regulation. Not only are U.S. 
banks in competition with European, Asian, and other banks, but the 
United States is a key member of the G-20 and other organizations that 
are creating new paradigms for financial regulation in response to the 
financial crisis. Therefore, the views, laws, and policies of other key 
jurisdictions will affect the path of U.S. financial regulation and 
regulatory reform. Nevertheless, the United States has a different history 
and tradition with regard to bank regulation than many other countries. 
The First Bank of the United States, the first federal central bank, was 
controversial and was destroyed by Andrew Jackson,31 not to be 
resurrected until 1913.32 Banks have long been demonized by populists, 
and politicians have opted for weak banks and cheap money during 
 
 28. See e.g., United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 64,900 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1982) 
(consent decree ending ongoing AT&T antitrust litigation). For an additional discussion, see Thomas 
E. Kauper, Notable Antitrust Cases: The AT&T Case: A Personal View, 5 Competition Pol’y Int’l 253 
(2009). 
 29. Nathan Koppel, Justice Department Launches Antitrust Investigation of IBM, WSJ Law Blog 
(Oct. 8, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/08/justice-department-launches-antitrust-
investigation-of-ibm/. 
 30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 19–22. 
 32. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522 
(2006)). 
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many periods of American history.33 The Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) 
has been tarnished by its failure to prevent the financial meltdown of 
2008, and while it has maintained and even increased its powers in the 
2010 financial reform, it is probably less independent than before. 
Therefore, although the United States is not the economic hegemon it 
was after World War II, and although the global regulators may choose 
to do so, Americans may not decide to embrace an all-powerful central 
bank regulator and a corresponding oligopoly of money center banks. 
I.  The Regulation and Deregulation of Banking: 1933–1999 
Between 1933 and 1999, banks were subject to geographical and 
activities restrictions that were gradually eroded by regulatory fiat and 
Congressional action and inaction. By the end of the twentieth century, 
U.S. banks were allowed to operate as universal banks. Dodd-Frank did 
not reverse this development. 
A. Geographical Restrictions 
Some of the important restrictions on banks designed to prevent 
excessive concentration of financial power were the prohibitions against 
branching interstate and intrastate. These restrictions were based on a 
desire to control banks on a community level, to have and encourage 
close relationships between bankers and borrowers within those 
communities, and to avoid centralized financial power.34 These 
restrictions were also utilized to limit competition.35 When the federal 
banking system was established in 1864, the National Bank Act allowed 
banks to be either chartered as a state or as a national bank, but national 
banks were not permitted to branch.36 Then, in the 1900s, states began 
granting branching powers to state-chartered banks, giving state banks a 
competitive edge over national banks. In 1927, Congress authorized 
national banks to open a limited number of branches in local 
communities if the law of that state permitted state-chartered banks to 
do so, and by way of a 1933 amendment, provided national banks with 
full equality to branch throughout their home states to the same extent 
the states permitted their own banks to branch.37 The effect of this 
 
 33. See generally Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of 
American Corporate Finance (1994). 
 34. Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. Legis. 255, 255–56 (1995). 
 35. See George Melloan, The Efficiency Argument for Banking Reform, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 
1987, at 15. 
 36. See National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864); see also First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. 
Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 648–49 (1924). 
 37. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 
(2006)); Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 257. 
Karmel_62-HLJ-821 (Do Not Delete) 4/16/2011 1:08 PM 
830 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:821 
deference to state regulators was to prevent out-of-state banks from 
opening branches, with the result that weak banks were propped up and 
the country became over-banked.38 Some states also prevented branching 
intrastate. For example, a provision to this effect was in the Illinois 
Constitution from 1870 to 1993, preventing the Chicago money center 
banks from branching into city, suburban, and downstate neighborhoods.39 
In the 1940s and 1950s, banks formed bank holding companies as a 
device to circumvent the restrictions on interstate and intrastate 
branching. The holding company structure allowed a bank to effectively 
create a branch in different states or communities even though branching 
was not allowed.40 The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 195641 partially closed this end-run around geographic 
restrictions by prohibiting a bank holding company from acquiring an 
interstate bank unless there was explicit statutory authorization by the 
state where the bank to be acquired was located.42 
In the 1970s, American banks complained that foreign banks 
operating in the United States had a competitive advantage, because 
they were not restricted by the McFadden Act43 and therefore could 
establish interstate branches easily.44 In response, Congress passed the 
International Banking Act of 1978, restricting foreign bank branching in 
the United States, and also establishing federal rules to govern those 
foreign bank operations.45 After Ronald Reagan became President, the 
Department of the Treasury issued a report to Congress criticizing the 
McFadden Act as “ineffective, inequitable, inefficient and anachronistic.”46 
 
 38. See Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. Banking Inst. 221, 
234 (2000). 
 39. Illinois Bank Branching History, Ill. Dep’t of Fin. and Prof’l Regulation, 
http://www.obre.state.il.us/cbt/STATS/br-hist.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). For a brief discussion of 
how the constraints on branching in Illinois may have led to the collapse of Continental Illinois, see 
Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 
57 Fordham L. Rev. 501, 507–08 n.24 (1989); Goodman & Shaffer, supra note 18, at 151 n.33; Joseph 
Silvia, Efficiency and Effectiveness in Securities Regulation: Comparative Analysis of the United States’s 
Competitive Regulatory Structure and the United Kingdom’s Single-Regulator Model, 6 DePaul Bus. & 
Com. L.J. 247, 260–61 (2008). 
 40. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 257. 
 41. Ch. 240, sec. 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) 
(1994)), repealed in part by Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1942(d) (2006)). 
 42. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 258. As some states recognized the benefits holding 
companies offered in terms of attracting new investment capital to their states, this restriction slowly 
eroded, but in some cases was limited by reciprocity requirements. Id. 
 43. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 44. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 259. 
 45. Pub. L. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3111 (2006)). 
 46. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Restrictions on Commercial Banking in the United 
States: The Report of the President 17 (1981). 
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Although Congress did not respond to this criticism for another 
decade, the banking industry was able to persuade some states to move 
to regional compacts permitting interstate branching. Such compacts 
were upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that the legislative 
history of the Douglas Amendment contemplated that some states might 
partially lift the ban on interstate banking but not open up to banking 
from all states.47 In addition, banks began to introduce automated teller 
machines (“ATMs”) as a way to expand their operations. At first, some 
courts held that ATMs were branches, but when the Comptroller of the 
Currency ruled that shared ATMs were not subject to the McFadden 
Act’s branching limitations, ATMs spread across the country.48 
In the early 1990s, Congress finally ended branching restrictions by 
passing the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal”).49 A number of reasons were given for the 
statute, including a concern that the geographic banking restrictions 
hindered the competitiveness of the U.S. banking industry, the view that 
interstate branching would promote diversification of bank assets and 
loan portfolios, and greater customer convenience and choice.50 The Act 
allowed bank holding companies to acquire separate banks in multiple 
states as long as the Fed found the holding company adequately 
capitalized and managed.51 Riegle-Neal also authorized the Comptroller 
of the Currency to approve the establishment and operation of interstate 
national bank branches,52 and the FDIC to approve interstate branches of 
insured state nonmember banks.53 
The geographic restrictions on banking did prevent concentration of 
banking in the United States, and, in fact, resulted in the opposite 
problem—too many uncompetitive banks that failed when they were 
forced by economic and technological developments and deregulation to 
compete with bigger and better capitalized banking and other financial 
institutions. Furthermore, with the advent of the Internet and national 
 
 47. Ne. Bancorp., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 168–69, 172 
(1985). 
 48. Markham, supra note 38, at 249 nn.181–82. Nevertheless, the Comptroller’s ruling was 
challenged in a case in the D.C. Circuit that held that ATMs were branches within the meaning of the 
National Bank Act. Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). The Comptroller was then forced to reverse his position that ATMs were 
not branches. See Customer Bank Communication Terminals, 41 Fed. Reg. 48,333 (Nov. 3, 1976). This 
did not stop the spread of ATMs. About 50,000 ATMs were operating in the United States in 1983, 
and by 1996, there were 120,000. Markham, supra note 38, at 249 & n.182. 
 49. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles 
of U.S.C. (2006)). 
 50. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 34, at 266–67, 269. 
 51. Stacey Stritzel, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: 
Progress Toward a New Era in Financial Services Regulation, 46 Syracuse L. Rev. 161, 174–79 (1995). 
 52. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2006). 
 53. Id. § 1828(d)(4). 
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connectivity via new technologies, it would be wholly unrealistic to 
attempt to contain the size of banks and other financial institutions 
through geographical limitations. 
B. Activities and Conflict of Interest Restrictions 
Banks traditionally performed three functions of value to the 
economy. They accepted deposits for savings and trust funds, and also 
for liquid assets; they acted as payments intermediaries for both 
consumers and businesses; and, they channeled deposits into the credit 
markets to meet the needs of businesses and consumers.54 Because of the 
importance of maintaining depositor confidence in banks, banks have 
enjoyed special governmental privileges, including federal deposit 
insurance since 1933, and they have also been subject to regulation. 
Among other things, Congress has endeavored to minimize the exposure 
of banks to risk, to prevent major commercial banks from concentrating 
financial power, and to prevent banks from becoming entangled in 
conflicts of interest.55 The thrust of federal bank regulation has been 
aimed at maintaining the safety and soundness of banks through capital 
controls, activities restrictions, and conflict of interest prohibitions. 
Activities restrictions and conflict of interest prohibitions are closely 
related. When banks engage in activities that involve conflicts of interest, 
they undermine their safety and soundness. Likewise, if banks engage in 
lines of business that are unnecessary to effective banking, they 
undertake needless risks.56 
Therefore, only regulators determined banks’ ability to engage in 
activities incidental to banking. S&Ls were more circumscribed than 
banks, but when Congress passed the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which phased out 
interest rate caps on commercial banks and S&Ls,57 it also deregulated 
the activities restrictions on S&Ls so that they could generally compete 
with commercial banks and also invest up to 20% of their assets in 
commercial real estate loans.58 Further, they were allowed to sell their 
mortgage loans and use the proceeds to seek better returns.59 This 
 
 54. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System: The Policy Basis for 
Continued Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking, 35 Am. U. L. Rev. 647, 653–54 (1986). 
 55. Note, National Banks and the Brokerage Business: The Comptroller’s New Reading of the 
Glass-Steagall Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1303, 1335 (1983). 
 56. Id. at 1336–37. 
 57. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 401(c)(2)(A), 94 Stat. 142 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 401(c)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(A) (2006)). Removing the 
cap on interest that S&Ls could pay depositors, but taking no action to change the fixed long-term 
mortgage rates—generally capped by state usury laws that were much less than the rate of inflation—
was a recipe for widespread bankruptcies by S&Ls. Trying to fix this problem by allowing S&Ls to 
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deregulation led to the failure of numerous S&Ls. Commercial bank and 
S&L failures between 1980 and 1994 were somewhere between 1300 and 
1600.60 The taxpayer bailout of these failed institutions may have cost as 
much as $300 billion.61 
The most important activities and conflict of interest restrictions for 
purposes of this Article were those in Glass-Steagall, which was passed in 
1933 as an important part of the New Deal effort to restore public 
confidence in the country’s financial system.62 It was linked with the 
passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which provided federal 
insurance for retail bank accounts.63 Glass-Steagall was passed to prevent 
banks from exploiting conflicts of interest in certain activities, 
specifically: making loans to corporations for which the bank or its 
affiliates had underwritten securities, selling securities to trust accounts, 
and giving investment advice to bank managed accounts.64 
This legislation had two types of provisions separating investment 
and commercial banking. Direct combinations were regulated under 
section 16 of Glass-Steagall, which prohibited national banks and state 
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System from 
purchasing, underwriting, or dealing in securities, except as provided in 
the Act.65 Section 21 prohibited institutions involved in underwriting, 
selling, or distributing securities from also taking deposits.66 The second 
type of provision prevented indirect combinations. Section 20 prohibited 
Federal Reserve System member banks from being affiliated with any 
organization engaged in the issuance, underwriting, public sale, or 
distribution of non-exempt securities.67 Section 32 prohibited Federal 
Reserve and state member banks from sharing personnel with entities 
primarily engaged in the issuance, underwriting, public sale, or 
distribution of securities.68 The policy of restricting bank activities was 
 
engage in risky real estate ventures clearly made matters even worse. 
 60. Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of 
Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 595, 636 (1999). Several of the 
factors accounting for the large number of failures included an increase in competition from within the 
banking industry and non-bank competitors that led banks to participate in more speculative activities, 
deregulation in the early 1980s, regional recessions—especially given the fact that geographic banking 
restrictions were still in place—and management inattention and misconduct. Id. 
 61. See Adams, supra note 6, at 17, 279; see also Richard W. Stevenson, G.A.O. Puts Cost of 
S.&L. Bailout at Half a Trillion Dollars, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1996, at 34. 
 62. Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated 
Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 Brook. L. Rev. 1295, 1298 (1995). 
 63. See supra note 17. 
 64. Di Lorenzo, supra note 54, at 677. 
 65. Ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162, 185 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006)). 
 66. Id. § 21 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2006)). 
 67. Id. § 20 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994) (repealed 1999)). 
 68. Id. § 32 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994) (repealed 1999)). 
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further developed in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,69 which 
gave the Fed the power to pass upon new business activities by large 
banks. Under section 4(c)(6) of that statute, nonbank subsidiaries of 
bank holding companies were permitted to engage in activities the Fed 
found to be closely related to banking and, therefore, “a proper incident 
thereto.”70 Similar regulatory approvals by the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (“OCC”) enforced Glass-Steagall as to national banks.71 
This was not a complete separation of banking and securities activities, 
since banks were allowed to underwrite and deal in U.S. government and 
municipal bonds.72 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the bank regulators and Congress 
engaged in a general deregulation of banking that over time, permitted 
banks, and especially large money center banks, to engage in most 
aspects of the securities business. This story has been told by others and 
will not be repeated here.73 In addition, securities firms pushed into 
banking by establishing money market funds and cash management 
accounts and buying “nonbank banks.”74 Many of these activities could 
only be conducted in separate subsidiaries, and so this reintegration of 
the banking and securities businesses occurred in financial holding 
companies.75 This suited the SEC and the bank regulators, since they 
were able to maintain jurisdiction over the entities they had traditionally 
regulated through the mechanism of functional regulation. Unfortunately, 
functional regulation meant that no financial regulator had a complete 
picture of financial institution holding companies or the power to curtail 
their activities in subsidiaries not regulated by their primary regulator, or 
in many cases, by any regulator.76 
 
 69. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1850 (2006)). 
 70. Id. § 4(c)(6) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)); see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Clarke, 865 
F.2d 278, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 71. See, e.g., First Tennessee Bank, 1999-WO-08-0015, Conditional Approval No. 351 (Comp. 
Currency Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/feb00/ 
ca351.pdf; Zions First National Bank, 97-WO-08-0003, Conditional Approval No. 262 (Comp. 
Currency Dec. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Zions First National], available at http://www.occ.gov/static/ 
interpretations-and-precedents/dec97/ca262.pdf. 
 72. Zions First National Bank, supra note 71. 
 73. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 6, at 39–48; Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services 
Industry Puts Together Let No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to 
the 2008–2009 American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 Alb. L. Rev. 371, 399 (2010); Markham, supra note 
38, at 250–52; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215, 312–13, 316; see 
also Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 441, 468 n.172 
(1998). 
 74. See David M. Eaton, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of Investment Banks and 
Other Nonbanks, 44 Emory L.J. 1187, 1200–13 (1995). 
 75.  See id. at 1200–02. 
 76. See Markham, supra note 38, at 264. 
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Two additional developments changed the nature of the banking 
and securities industry and injected enormous risks into the capital 
markets: the development and growth of derivatives and securitization. 
Financial futures began to be traded on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange in 1975.77 The Fed approved J.P. Morgan & Co.’s application 
to create a “futures commission merchant” in 1982. The business of this 
subsidiary was to deal in bullion and foreign exchange, U.S. government 
securities, money market instruments and Eurodollar CDs.78 One side 
effect of this development, which seemed innocuous enough at the time, 
was that yet another functional regulator—the CFTC—was added to the 
mix of federal regulators of banks.79 The second important development 
was the widespread use of securitization to transform loans by banks and 
other financial institutions into liquid, asset backed securities.80 
Congress finally blessed the financial supermarket concept that the 
financial services industry had already created with the permission of 
their financial regulators, and the cooperation of the courts, when it 
passed Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999, repealing Glass-Steagall.81 From at 
least two perspectives, the financial meltdown of 2008 can be blamed on 
the repeal of Glass-Steagall. First, the immediate cause of the meltdown 
was the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, which had been 
propelled by the widespread securitization of real estate loans and the 
change of the banking business from an “originate to hold” model to an 
“originate to distribute” model of financing mortgages and other 
consumer loans.82 Second, in Gramm-Leach-Bliley and subsequently, in 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,83 Congress not only 
failed to construct a regulatory system to match the permitted 
commingling of banking and securities, but it specifically prohibited any 
regulatory agency from controlling the growth of certain derivatives 
transactions.84 Therefore, excessive leverage and risk were injected into 
the financial system. 
 
 77. CFTC History in the 1970s, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, http://www.cftc.gov/ 
About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_1970s.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 78. See Markham, supra note 38, at 252. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product 
Development, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1553, 1557–58 (2008); see also Wilmarth, supra note 73, at 389. 
 81. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 
U.S.C.). 
 82. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 76–77; see also Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk 
Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1327, 
1329–30 (2009). 
 83. Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
 84. Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 136–37 (discussing the passage of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act and the driving forces behind it); see Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the 
Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 Ind. L.J. 777, 793–96 (2010) (addressing the 
passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the failed attempt at a comprehensive regulatory system for the 
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Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Glass-Steagall can be resurrected in 
the form in which it previously existed. The banking and securities 
businesses are very different from what they were in 1933. Securitization 
has transformed all bank loans into securities.85 Investment firms own 
banks, and market and manage money market funds that function like 
bank accounts.86 Yet, the same conflict-of-interest problems remain and 
such conflicts still lead to dangerous risk-taking. The current reincarnation 
of a Glass-Steagall wall between deposit-taking institutions and the 
conflicts and risks inherent in the securities business have come in the 
form of the Volcker Rule, as proposed by the Department of the 
Treasury and included in the original Senate version of Dodd-Frank. The 
Volker Rule was seriously compromised in the final form of the Act: 
This Rule, essentially, would have prohibited any banking entity from 
engaging in proprietary trading, or sponsoring or investing in a hedge 
fund or private equity fund.87 Lobbyists injected numerous big exceptions 
to the Rule, including transactions on behalf of customers, and wide 
discretion is given to financial regulators to permit activities in 
derogation of the Rule.88 Yet, limits on permitted activities demonstrate 
the Rule’s fundamental purpose. These limits are that no transaction 
may be permitted if it would involve or result in a material conflict of 
interest, result in a material exposure to high risk assets or high risk 
trading strategies, pose a threat to the safety and soundness of the 
 
commingling of banking and securities); see also Carol A. Needham, Listening to Cassandra: The 
Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and Taking Action, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2329, 2331 (2010). 
 85.  See Wilmarth, supra note 73, at 230–31. 
 86. See Group of Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability 29 (2009) 
(recommending money market funds be regulated as banks). During the financial meltdown, when the 
Reserve Fund “[broke] the buck,” the Treasury provided insurance akin to deposit insurance on 
money market fund accounts. See Joseph R. Fleming et al., The Future of Money Market Funds: 
Implications of the Recent Turmoil, 42 Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. 107, 108 (2009). 
 87. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, secs. 619, 621, §§ 13, 27B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–32 
(2010) (amending the Bank Holding Company Act by adding new section 13, and the Securities Act of 
1933 by adding new section 27B). 
 88. Id. The exceptions to the Volcker Rule, identified in section 619 of the Act, id. sec. 619, 
§ 13(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 1623–26, and which apply to all covered banking entities, are as follows: First, a 
range of U.S. government securities and state government obligations are excluded from the definition 
of covered instruments. Id. § 13(d)(1)(A). Second, transactions that are made in connection with 
underwriting or market-making related activities, to the extent those activities are not designed to 
exceed the reasonably expected demands of clients, customers or counterparties, are exempt. Id. 
§ 13(d)(1)(B). The third exception is for risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with 
individual or aggregated holdings of the covered banking entity. Id. § 13(d)(1)(C). The fourth 
exception is for transactions on behalf of customers. Id. § 13(d)(1)(D). There is also an exception for 
regulated insurance companies and their affiliates that make investments for the general account of 
the insurance company in accordance with state law, id. § 13(d)(1)(F), and one permitting a covered 
banking entity to trade solely outside the United States as long as it is not directly or indirectly owned 
or controlled by a covered banking entity organized under the laws of United States or any of the 
states. Id. § 13(d)(1)(H).  
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banking entity, or pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.89 The past 
conduct of financial regulators in bowing to the interests of banks and 
allowing them to undermine and then completely destroy Glass-Steagall 
suggests that the Volcker Rule, already watered down, will not be 
rigorously applied over time. The largest banks are simply too big and 
too powerful to be constrained. The questions posed by this Article are 
whether they need to be dismantled, and if so, how can such 
deconcentration be accomplished. 
II.  Bank Failures, Deregulation, and the Growth of 
Financial Supermarkets 
The deregulation of stock exchange commission rates and bank 
interest rates led to the failure of many broker-dealers, S&Ls, and banks. 
Before 1980, the FDIC reported approximately six bank closures 
annually.90 In 1981, the number increased to ten.91 During the 1980s, bank 
failures and consolidations occurred at a record level, and the too-big-to-
fail doctrine was born.92 By the end of the 1980s, 200 banks annually were 
forced to close.93 By 1991, the FDIC had paid approximately $11.8 billion 
to protect depositors in the fourteen failures of banks with assets over $1 
billion.94 
In order to protect the federal deposit insurance fund95 and similar 
guarantee funds for securities firms96 and S&Ls,97 financial regulators 
 
 89. Id. sec. 619, § 13(d)(2). 
 90. Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 Bus. Law. 
907, 908 (1989). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id; see also infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 93. Lindley H. Clark, Jr., Financial Services: Regulation’s Revival, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1990, at 
A1. 
 94. Economic Implications of the “Too Big to Fail” Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Econ. Stabilization of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 36, 37 (1991) 
(statement of Johnny C. Finch, Dir. of Planning & Reporting, Gen. Accounting Office). At the time, 
some in Congress viewed FDIC insurance as reducing market discipline. Id. at 66–67 (statement of 
Rep. Thomas R. Carper, Chairman, Subcomm. on Econ. Stabilization & Comm. on Banking, Fin. & 
Urban Affairs). 
 95. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 96. In the late 1960s, Congress enacted the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”). 
Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (2006)). SIPA 
established the private, nonprofit Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) that 
administers a fund to protect the accounts of securities investors. See id. SIPC protects investors from 
losses due to broker-dealer failure. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities 
Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1071, 
1074 (1999). Since its inception, SIPC membership grew rapidly, but so did broker-dealer failures due 
to “depressed securities markets, speculation in the new issue market, bookkeeping problems, 
inadequate capital, mismanagement, poor supervision of subordinates, and fraud.” Harold S. 
Bloomenthal & Donald Salcito, Customer Protection from Brokerage Failures: The Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation and the SEC, 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 161, 162 (1983); see also Michael E. Don & 
Josephine Wang, Stockbroker Liquidations Under the Securities Investor Protection Act and Their 
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encouraged acquisitions of weak financial institutions by stronger 
organizations.98 Indeed the “failing firm” doctrine enabled many financial 
institutions to acquire financial institutions that they otherwise would 
have been unable to acquire for either regulatory or antitrust reasons.99 
When merger partners could not be found for Continental Illinois, a 
troubled major bank in 1984, the financial regulators bought the bad 
debt, thus giving rise to the too-big-to-fail doctrine.100 Being saved by the 
federal government did not prevent Continental Illinois from making 
further business errors. During the week of the 1987 stock market crash, 
it was forced to make a $620 million capital infusion into First Options of 
Chicago, Inc., a Continental Illinois subsidiary that was a major clearing 
firm for options makers on the Chicago Board Options Exchange.101 
Finally, this too-big-to-fail bank was acquired by Bank of America in 
1994, relieving the banking regulators of the burden of further 
overseeing this troublesome organization.102 Ironically, one of the reasons 
the Fed saved Continental Illinois was because of the potential domino 
effect of its failure on other banks, including Bank of America.103 
The banking crises of the 1980s, coupled with further deregulation 
of banking, led to the growth of ever bigger regional and national banks 
 
Impact on Securities Transfers, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 509, 510–12 (1990). As of the 2009 fiscal year, 
SIPC had 4956 members across the various national exchanges. 2009 SIPC Ann. Rep. 8. 
 97. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) was created as part of the 
National Housing Act of 1934 in order to insure deposits in S&Ls. See ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1750g (1988)). FSLIC administered deposit insurance for S&Ls. See 
id. §§ 402–403, 48 Stat. at 1256–58. By 1984, over 30% of all FSLIC insured institutions were operating 
at a loss. See Markham, supra note 38, at 245. Financially troubled S&Ls raised concerns that FSLIC 
would not have sufficient funds to pay insured deposits. Id. at 246. Still, the S&L industry lost some $7 
billion in 1987. Id. Over 1000 S&Ls closed down by 1988. Id. As a result, the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 abolished FSLIC and replaced it with the Savings 
Association Insurance Fund, which is administered by the FDIC. Id. at 247; see Pub. L. 101-73, 103 
Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 98.  See Zabihollah Rezaee, Financial Institutions, Valuations, Mergers, and Acquisitions: 
The Fair Value Approach 15–16 (2001).  
 99. See id. (explaining that well-capitalized banks acquired weaker banks, partially because 
regulators look favorably upon the efficiency and high capital ratios of the stronger banks); Markham, 
supra note 38, at 245 n.151 (noting that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board encouraged mergers 
among S&Ls); see also Melanie Fein, Securities Activities of Banks, 1-44 to 1-44.2 (2011) (listing 
major acquisitions). It is noteworthy that acquisition by a stronger competitor is markedly different 
from acquisition by a regulator in the “too-big-to-fail” scenario. See Foster, supra note 6, at 52. Both 
arguably may lead to off-loading of toxic assets, improved balance sheets, and, hopefully, economic 
benefit for stakeholders and shareholder. Since there are fewer sizable competitors to absorb sizable 
organizations, mergers and acquisitions result in banks that are too-big-to-fail. See Foster, supra note 
6, at 52. 
 100. Foster, supra note 6, at 51; see also supra notes 12 & 18 and accompanying text. 
 101. Dennis P. O’Connell, Reviewing the Year: The Top 5 Stories, Am. Banker, Dec. 28, 1987, at 5. 
 102. Barry Ritholtz & Aaron Task, Bailout Nation: How Greed and Easy Money Corrupted 
Wall Street and Shook the World Economy 218 (2009). 
 103. 1 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience 548 
(1998). 
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and of the mega-financial institution holding company.104 As the stronger 
banks went on a shopping spree, a new type of bank entered the scene in 
the 1990s: the super-regional bank.105 The self-perpetuating dynamic led 
to stronger banks getting bigger and stronger, as the number of smaller 
local banks shrunk. The emerging regional banks outpaced the extant 
regulatory framework.106 Mergers and acquisitions reduced the number 
of banks from around 14,000 in 1980 to fewer than 10,000 in 1995.107 
Similarly, as the barriers between investment banking and commercial 
banking continued to erode, further deregulation promoted “one stop 
financial shopping at banks and bank holding companies.”108 
Further, as the country was lurching toward the complete 
dismantling of Glass-Steagall and other Depression-era constraints on 
banks and investment banks, a series of financial crises challenged 
financial regulators and led to the preservation of the new paradigm of 
mega-financial institutions dominating capital markets, ensuring their 
global competitiveness. These crises included the stock market crash of 
1987, which became known as “Black Monday,”109 the stock market crash 
of 1989,110 the Latin American debt crisis of 1980s,111 the Asian debt crisis 
of the 1990s,112 the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management,113 and 
 
 104. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 82–87. 
 105. They included Banc One Corporation, First Chicago/NBD Corporation, Fleet Financial, 
Norwest Corporation, CoreStates, First Union, Wachovia Corporation, Wells Fargo, and 
NationsBank. Markham, supra note 38, at 256; see John Spiegel et al., How Superregional 
Powerhouses Are Reshaping Financial Services, at xiii (1996). These regional banks also were a 
response to the way in which the ban on interstate banking became eroded by regional interstate 
banking compacts. See supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text. 
 106. Spiegel et al., supra note 105; see Peter C. Carstensen, Public Policy Toward Interstate Bank 
Mergers: The Case for Concern, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1397, 1415–18 (1989). 
 107. Spiegel et al., supra note 105. 
 108. See Markham, supra note 38, at 260 (quoting David R. Satin, Breaking Down the Wall: The 
Unofficial End of Glass-Steagall, Bank Sec. J., July–Aug. 1997, at 11, 11) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 109. Annelena Lobb, Looking Back at Black Monday: A Discussion with Richard Sylla, Wall. St. 
J. (Oct. 15, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119212671947456234.html. It is noteworthy that the 
Black Monday crash was arguably the early warning signal of the recent May 6, 2010 flash crash. The 
price fluctuation aspects of both crashes ultimately were blamed on excessive and rapid automated 
computer trading. See id. 
 110. See Robert Shiller, Exuberant Reporting: Media and Misinformation in the Markets, 23 Harv. 
Int’l Rev. 60, 63 (2001). The stock market crash that occurred on Friday, October 13, 1989 is widely 
believed to have been caused by a reaction to a news story of the breakdown of a $6.75 billion 
leveraged buyout deal for UAL Corporation, the parent company of United Airlines. See id. 
(discussing but ultimately disagreeing with this position). 
 111. The Latin American debt crisis occurred in the early 1980s, when Latin American countries 
reached a point where their foreign debt exceeded their earning power, and they were not able to 
repay it. See Markham, supra note 38, at 242. Mexico’s announcement that it could not meet its debt 
obligations were followed by defaults in Brazil, Argentina, and more than twenty other countries. See 
id. at 242 & n.128. The largest American banks had Latin American loans on their books that 
amounted to nearly 50% of their capital. See id. 
 112. See generally The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications, And Solutions (William 
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the bursting of the technology stock market bubble in the 1990s.114 These 
crises were caused in part by explicit and implicit government 
guarantees. Impeded by a credibility deficit and capital flight, developing 
countries were unable to manage the crisis. They turned to the 
International Monetary Fund and the Fed, which intervened to protect 
the creditor banks that kept credit flowing.115 The loans to Mexico, for 
example, and subsequent packages to the Asian crisis countries, were 
perceived to be a bailout.116 Indeed, crisis prevention in the form of a 
financial safety net, such as virtually universal deposit insurance, planted 
the seeds for another crisis.117 The anticipation of a government bailout 
would create moral hazard and imprudent lending during subsequent 
years.118 Thus, the doctrine of too-big-to-fail was to play a major role in 
the Fed’s policy in the coming decade. In 1999, reacting to the mounting 
political pressure from banking giants, Congress repealed Glass-
Steagall.119 This final deregulation of Depression-era financial regulation 
resulted in a further consolidation of financial services, because banks 
could now freely form financial holding companies that could engage in a 
 
Curt Hunter et al. eds., 1999). On October 27, 1997, the Dow Jones industrial plunged 554 points or 
7.2%, amid ongoing worries about the Asian economies. The New York Stock Exchange briefly 
suspended trading. Div. of Mkt. Regulation, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Trading Analysis of October 27 
and 28, 1997 (2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/tradrep.htm. The crisis led to a drop in consumer 
and spending confidence. See id. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision would eventually note 
that East Asian financial institutions, prior to the crisis, “took on excessive risk, in part due to implicit 
government guarantees.” Gary H. Stern & Ron J. Feldman, Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank 
Bailouts 28 (2004) (quoting Rudi Bonte et al., Bank for Int’l Settlements, Supervisory Lessons to Be 
Drawn from the Asian Crisis 57 (Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision Working Paper No. 2, 1999)). 
 113. Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) was a U.S. hedge fund which used trading 
strategies such as fixed income arbitrage, statistical arbitrage, and pairs trading, combined with high 
leverage. Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World 193–95 (2007). 
It failed spectacularly in the late 1990s, leading to a massive bailout by other major banks and 
investment houses, which was supervised by the Fed. Id. One of the mega-banks that emerged from 
this crisis was Bank of America, which had taken a major hit when Russian bonds defaulted and was 
then acquired by NationsBank and renamed BankAmerica. The resulting entity had combined assets 
of $570 billion and 4800 branches in twenty-two states. R. Christian Bruce & Eileen Canning, 
NationsBank-BankAmerica Deal Clears; Merger Creates Largest U.S. Bank Firm, Daily Rep. Exec. 
(BNA) No. 159, at A-9 (Aug. 18, 1998). Despite this large size, federal regulators insisted only upon 
the divestiture of thirteen branches in New Mexico. Id.; Business Brief—NationsBankCorp.:Federal 
Reserve Approves Merger With BankAmerica, Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1998, at 1. 
 114. Stephen E. Frank & E.S. Browning, Bursting of the Tech Bubble Has a Familiar “Pop” to It, 
Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at C1. 
 115. See Wilmarth, supra note 73, at 224–25. 
 116. See generally Ian Vasquez, A Retrospective on the Mexican Bailout, 21 Cato J. 545 (2002). 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. at 308–09. 
 119. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act),, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). The Act was signed by President William Jefferson Clinton on Nov. 12, 
1999. See Markham, supra note 38, at 263–64; see also Michael Schroeder, Congress Passes Financial-
Services Bill, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1999, at A2.  
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broad array of financial services.120 Gramm-Leach-Bliley broadly defined 
the modern functional regulatory framework that remains in place today, 
as embellished by Dodd-Frank.121 
The merger of Travelers Group with Citicorp, the parent company 
of Citibank, in April 1998, challenged what remained of Glass-Steagall 
before Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Although Citigroup was given two years to 
divest any prohibited assets, aggressive lobbying by former Secretary of 
the Treasury Robert Rubin and the heads of Citicorp persuaded 
Congress to instead pass Gramm-Leach-Bliley.122 At this time, Citicorp 
was the world’s largest supplier of credit cards, and Citibank was the 
second largest bank in the United States.123 When it acquired Travelers, it 
became a financial supermarket: a one-stop shop for insurance, 
investment banking, brokerage, and other financial services.124 One 
commentator has called this “the moment when Citi went from being a 
very large bank to becoming an unmanageable Goliath.”125 
The decade following the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley witnessed 
both bank failures and continued contraction among financial services 
firms. According to the FDIC’s Failed Bank List, 283 banks closed from 
2000 to 2010.126 These banks were local, less well-capitalized banks; their 
ranks included commercial banks, investment banks, and S&Ls.127 Credit 
Unions around the country were also impacted, and many closed.128 The 
first decade of the twenty-first century continued to witness contraction 
among financial institutions across the U.S. In order to deal with the 
collapse of large firms, regulators encouraged financial institutions to 
acquire firms that they otherwise would have been unable to acquire for 
either regulatory or antitrust reasons.129 
 
 120. See Markham, supra note 38, at 263; see also Michael Schroeder, Glass-Steagall Compromise 
Is Reached, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1999, at A2. 
 121. Commercial banking activities are regulated by the bank regulators, while securities activities 
are regulated by the SEC and state securities commissions. Commodity futures and options activities 
are regulated by the CFTC, and insurance activities are regulated by multiple state insurance 
regulators. Markham, supra note 38, at 264. 
 122. Ritholtz, supra note 102, at 213–14. 
 123. See id. at 212. 
 124. See Markham, supra note 38, at 262–63. 
 125. See Ritholtz, supra note 102, at 212. 
 126. Failed Bank List, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/ 
banklist.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 127. Id. 
 128. The National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) does not have a table of failed credit 
unions prior to 2009, but a list of credit unions that failed between 2009 and 2010 can be found on the 
NCUA’s website. Closed Credit Unions 2010, Nat’l Credit Union Admin., http://www.ncua.gov/ 
Resources/ClosedCU/2010.aspx#top (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). For failed credit unions prior to 2009, 
see the NCUA press releases regarding failed credit unions. Press Releases 2011, Nat’l Credit Union 
Admin., http://www.ncua.gov/NewsPublications/News/PressRelease.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).  
 129. In 2007, Bank of America absorbed Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, increasing its assets from 
$1.7 trillion to $2.3 trillion. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 180. JPMorgan Chase absorbed 
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The Fed dealt with continuous deregulation in the face of banking 
and stock market crises by keeping interest rates low, encouraging the 
use of derivatives, and allowing the growth of financial holding 
companies.130 During the financial crisis of 2008, the Fed allowed and 
encouraged further mergers until only a baker’s dozen of large U.S. 
financial institutions were left standing.131 Other financial regulators 
cooperated in these matters by protecting their turf through the policy of 
functional regulation. The problem was that financial holding companies 
became huge, out-of-control hydras, that were “too-big-to-manage” and 
“too-big-to-discipline adequately.”132 Liabilities were pushed off the 
balance sheets133 of regulated entities into unregulated entities, often 
abroad and beyond the reach of U.S. regulators. 
Dodd-Frank has some features that, at least at the margins, ought to 
make for better regulation of financial firms by curbing excesses, 
promoting discipline, and increasing oversight.134 Although the statute 
gives regulators the power to design new rules, other provisions merely 
authorize regulators to study certain issues.135 An independent consumer 
protection agency has been created within the Fed, but many of its 
powers are a transfer of authority already existing at the Fed or other 
agencies.136 Other measures include creation of a systemic risk regulator, 
greater transparency and stability in derivatives trading, improved 
regulation of credit-rating agencies, and a partial ban on proprietary 
trading by banks.137 Nevertheless, Dodd-Frank accomplished a successful 
 
Bear Sterns and Washington Mutual, growing from $1.6 to $2 trillion. Id. Wells Fargo absorbed 
Wachovia and nearly doubled its assets. Id. In order for the deals to go through, Bank of America, 
JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo had to be exempted from a federal rule prohibiting any single bank from 
holding more than 10% of all deposits in the country, as well as from Department of Justice antitrust 
guidelines. Id. 
 130. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and 
the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 963, 975–76 (2009); see also Fin. Crisis 
Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 56 (2011). 
 131. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 180; Edward R. Herlihy et al., Convergence, 
Consolidation, Consternation and Complexity in an Industry in Transition: An Annual Review of 
Leading Developments, in Financial Institutions M&A 2009, at 267 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. 24859, 2010). See generally Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The 
Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System from 
Crisis—and Themselves (2009).  
 132. These terms have been used to describe mega-banks throughout the history of the too-big-to-
fail doctrine. See Wilmarth, supra note 73, at 290 n.311. 
 133. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 86; Kara Scannell & Carrick Mollenkamp, SEC 
Homes in on Lehman, “Funds of Funds”, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 2010, at C1. 
 134. See infra notes 252–74 and accompanying text. 
 135. Eleanor Laise, Congress Overhauls Your Portfolio, Wall St. J., July 17–18, 2010, at B7. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Randall Smith et al., Impact to Reach Beyond Wall Street, Wall St. J., July 16, 2010, at A4. 
With respect to hedge funds and derivatives, the bill authorizes the SEC and the CFTC to regulate 
derivatives jointly. Id. Derivative trades will run through clearing houses and exchanges, and hedge 
funds and private-equity firms must register with the SEC. See Laise, supra note 135. Also, companies 
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grab for more power by regulators who had set the stage for the financial 
meltdown by acceding to the creation of highly leveraged mega-banks. 
Furthermore, Congress has not addressed the basic economic problems 
that led to the meltdown, such as an overblown and speculative real 
estate market and enormous budget and trade deficits.138 Observers, 
commentators, and even regulators share the concern that the true 
nature of the country’s financial problems has not been addressed.139 
III.  The PUHCA as a Model for Dealing with the Mega-Banks  
The PUHCA was a special regulatory program designed to break up 
the public utility holding companies according to antitrust principles, but 
with a view toward restructuring rather than destroying the holding 
companies. There are some surprising similarities between the public 
 
that sell products like mortgage-backed securities must hold a stake in the instruments they sell. Id. 
With respect to bank regulation, the Fed has obtained more responsibility for big financial firms. Id. 
The Volcker Rule now prevents banks from trading with their own capital to some extent. Further, the 
new Bureau of Consumer Finance will have its own budget independent from the Fed. C. Boyden 
Gray, Wall Street Reform That Flouts the Law, Wash. Post, Dec. 31, 2010, at A17. To deal with the 
next bubble, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “Council”) will search for and identify 
systemic risks. Id. The Treasury obtained a new Office of Financial Research to collect data and 
investigate potential systemic issues. Id. Credit rating agencies will now be regulated by a dedicated 
office at the SEC. Id. 
 138. See Editorial, The Truth About the Deficit, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 2010 (Week in Review) at 9; 
David Leonhardt, Bubblenomics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2008, (Week in Review), at 1; David E. Sanger 
& Mark Landler, Obama Faces Calls for Rules on Finances, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2009, at A1. 
 139. The current framework allows for “regulatory arbitrage,” in which participants in the market 
can exploit the gaps in the multi-regulator system. “A trend toward something as questionable as 
subprime mortgages can easily develop because there are too many cooks, too many supervisors and 
no one is really coordinating.” John Poirier, Mortgage Woes Spotlight Bank Regulation, Reuters, Dec. 
7, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/12/07/us-usa-subprime-bankregulation-
idUSN0738500720071207 (quoting Michael Malloy, a former senior attorney of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency) (internal quotation marks omitted). In February 2008, FDIC Chairman 
Sheila Bair urged that in the future, “the home mortgage market needs strong rules.” Sheila C. Bair, 
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks at the Joint Venture Silicon Valley Network State of the 
Valley Conference (Feb. 22, 2008), transcript available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/ 
archives/2008/chairman/spfeb2208.html; see also, e.g., Les Leopold, Why the Wall Street-BP Double 
Standard?, The Huffington Post (June 25, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/les-leopold/why-do-
we-treat-wall-stre_b_625286.html (noting that, unlike BP during the Gulf oil spill, Wall Street is 
getting off for the havoc it wreaked on the American economy); Richard Posner, Abuse of Presidential 
Power?, The Becker-Posner Blog (July 17, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2010/ 
07/abuse-of-presidential-power-posner.html (focusing primarily on the Obama administration’s 
purportedly expansive view of presidential authority, and noting that the recent financial legislation 
does not resolve anything). The Economist also noted: 
Indeed, the new consumer bureau potentially creates another monster. Nor does it tackle 
the future status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to the chagrin of Republicans, who rightly 
view the two mammoth mortgage agencies as having played a leading role in causing the 
financial crisis. The final document may run close to 2,000 pages, but some very important 
issues are being left for another day. 
A Successful All-Nighter, The Economist Online (Jun 25th 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
newsbook/2010/06/americas_financial_reforms_agreed. 
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utility holding companies of the 1920s and today’s big bank holding 
companies, especially with regard to their complexity and political 
power. One solution to the systemic threat posed by the too-big-to-fail 
banks is to compel their restructuring by a regulatory agency according 
to a model based on the PUHCA. 
A. The Antitrust Model 
Are banks and other financial institutions that are too-big-to-fail in 
fact too big to be? One solution that has been suggested for the too-big-
to-fail problem is the consideration of systemic risk in the antitrust 
analysis with a view to breaking up the big banks pursuant to section 2 of 
the Sherman Act140 or section 7 of the Clayton Act.141 This is an appealing 
idea, because it involves the application of existing law to the problem of 
curtailing the size and power of the oligopoly of large financial 
institutions. Even if the political will could be found to embark on such a 
course, however, it would involve years of adversarial litigation with an 
uncertain prospect for success.142 Historically, even when the Department 
of Justice has been determined to take on Wall Street, it has been mostly 
unsuccessful in the cases it has brought.143 Yet, despite this lack of success 
in the courts, where a Department of Justice antitrust policy has been 
able to enlist the cooperation and support of the SEC or Congress, its 
views have prevailed.144 
 
 140. Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209, 209–10 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006 & Supp. 
III 2009)). 
 141. Foster, supra note 6, at 53–61; see Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 28 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006)). See generally William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The 
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1105 (1989). 
 142. In 1948, the Fed issued a complaint against Transamerica, the holding company of Bank of 
America, for violating the Clayton Act, which prohibits a corporation from acquiring the stock of a 
corporation that substantially lessened competition or created a monopoly. Marquis James & Bessie 
Rowland James, Biography of a Bank: The Story of Bank of America N.T. & S.A. 501 (1954). In 
1952, after almost two years of hearings, the Fed ordered Transamerica to divest all of its subsidiary 
banks and dispose of all of its stock in Bank of America. Id. But the Fed’s action was overturned by 
the court of appeals, which held that the Fed had failed to prove its monopoly charges against 
Transamerica. Id. at 501–15. 
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (exemplifying one of the 
biggest antitrust cases in history, against Wall Street underwriters, which did not lead to a conviction). 
 144. In the battle to unfix stock exchange commission rates, the Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division joined a suit against the New York Stock Exchange in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 
but this assault failed, because the Supreme Court held that the SEC could exercise direct and active 
supervision of rate fixing. 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975). Yet, the SEC and Congress mandated the unfixing 
of rates in 1975. See Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29, § 6(e)(1), 89 Stat. 97, (1975). 
Similarly, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division joined with the SEC to eliminate the one-
eighth trading convention in securities. National Association of Securities Dealers, Exchange Act 
Release No. 37,538, 49 SEC Docket 1346 (Aug. 8, 1996). 
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In the 1930s, a specialized antitrust program was brought against the 
public utility holding companies, fingered as culprits in the 1929 stock 
market crash, by the PUHCA. Although the PUHCA was passed in 
1935,145 it was not fully implemented until the 1950s, due to the intense 
opposition of the public utility companies, including court actions aimed 
at invalidating the statute.146 Yet, once the mandate of the statute was 
accepted by the judiciary, and the industry understood that the SEC had 
the power to restructure the public utilities, the SEC succeeded in doing 
so with the cooperation of the industry.147 The story of the PUHCA is an 
interesting one of an unusual and successful New Deal program that 
targeted a troublesome oligopoly, and one which could possibly serve as 
a model for future efforts to constrain mega-banks. Just as the antitrust 
laws would have to be applied globally to be utilized against the big 
banks,148 a PUHCA-type effort to rationalize financial institution holding 
companies would have to be implemented in cooperation with 
international regulators. This might not be impossible, given that at least 
one key regulator abroad in the United Kingdom has looked at the 
problems of global financial weaknesses through the lens of the unwieldy 
size of banks.149 Furthermore, the European Union is about to impose 
much stricter controls on risk-taking compensation structures in financial 
firms than the United States has even considered.150 
B. The Holding Company Structure 
Traditional corporate law viewed every corporation as a separate 
juridical entity.151 Until the end of the nineteenth century, one 
corporation could not own shares in another corporation.152 This doctrine 
changed in 1890, when New Jersey—then a leading state for the 
development of corporate law—permitted the acquisition and formation 
 
 145. Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 79–79(z)-6 (2000)), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 
(2005). 
 146. Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal 218–19 (1970). 
 147. Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance 257 (3d ed. 2003). 
 148. Foster, supra note 6, at 61–64. 
 149. David Shay Corbett II, Free Markets and Government Regulation, 14 N.C. Banking Inst. 547, 
552–53 (2010); see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 209–10. 
 150. Commission Report on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to 
Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, COM 
(2010) 243 final (May 27, 2010); Stephen Fidler & Alessandro Torello, Europe to Limit Banker 
Bonuses, Wall St. J., July 8, 2010, at A1; Elena Logutenkova, EU Investment Banks May Be Hurt by 
New Pay Rules, JP Morgan Says, Bloomberg (Jan. 18, 2011, 3:24 AM) http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-01-18/eu-investment-banks-may-be-hurt-by-new-pay-rules-jpmorgan-says.html. 
 151. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent 
and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 295, 297 (1996). 
 152. Id. 
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of subsidiaries without any statutory authorization.153 After that time, 
holding companies grew in a number of key industries. This change in 
corporate structures was recognized in a number of New Deal regulatory 
programs based on the recognition of enterprise principles, so that 
statutory imperatives applied not only to particular regulated entities, 
but also to persons controlling or controlled by them.154 The PUHCA was 
the first major federal statute to concentrate its provisions on the holding 
company. In particular, this statute dealt with the abuses and insolvencies 
of the country’s utilities. 
Between 1900 and 1930, improved generating equipment and other 
engineering advances led to the growth of interstate, rather than merely 
local, electric transmission.155 This technological advance led to the 
development of large holding companies with diversified and 
geographically-dispersed subsidiaries.156 Through the use of leverage, a 
holding company with a small investment in the voting securities of 
various subsidiaries could gain control over a huge complex of 
companies.157 Engineering, construction and financial companies were 
often housed in one system, in which the holding company earned 
income from dividends and management fees.158 These holding 
companies became extraordinarily complex. For example, by 1932, the 
Associated Gas and Electric system had 264 corporate entities.159 
Further, these giant utilities gobbled up independent operating 
companies. In 1914, there were eighty-five systems controlling two-thirds 
of the country’s private electric power output. By 1929, sixteen holding 
company groups controlled 92% of the country’s output.160 
The utility holding company was able to grow so large and 
complicated because it had certain advantages over other companies. A 
large holding company could secure capital on favorable terms, 
coordinate investment decisions based on engineering considerations 
rather than according to political boundaries, and attract and cultivate a 
larger pool of engineering talent.161 However, the unsound financial 
 
 153. Id. at 298. 
 154. Id. at 304. 
 155. Parrish, supra note 146, at 145–50. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 147. 
 158. Id. at 146–47. 
 159. Id. at 148. 
 160. Id. at 149. The most famous of the public utility holding companies were those controlled by 
Samuel Insull, a self-made businessman, who started his career working as Thomas Edison’s secretary, 
and who ended his career defending himself in a criminal prosecution after the bankruptcy of his 
holding company during the Depression. For an interesting description of Insull’s rise and fall, and a 
comparison of Insull to Enron, see Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to 
Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 Energy L.J. 35 
(2005). 
 161. James C. Bonbright, Public Utilities and the National Power Policies 23–24 (1940). 
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practices of these companies undermined these organizations and 
neutralized their advantages in comparison to isolated operating 
companies.162 The public utility holding companies were complicated to a 
degree almost beyond comprehension. According to Ferdinand Pecora, 
“the Insull structure was so complex that no one could fully grasp it, not 
even, probably, Mr. Insull himself.”163 
Like the public utility holding companies, financial holding 
companies have become large, complex, opaque and highly risky, in large 
part through the use of leverage. One could certainly conclude that the 
complexity and risks of their operations were not understood by their top 
officers and directors, or they would not have been allowed to spin out of 
control to the brink of extinction.164 Also like the public utility holding 
companies, financial holding companies developed new products through 
financial engineering, made possible by technology, geographic 
expansion, and deregulation.165 Banks and investment banks previously 
engaged in segmented aspects of the financial industry combined. These 
financial services holding companies had better access to capital than 
smaller specialized firms, were able to expand internationally, and had 
access to talented and entrepreneurial workers.166 But they utilized off-
balance sheet accounting to create leverage, and they invented financial 
instruments to spread risk that managed to create even greater risk.167 
These holding companies became so complicated and opaque that the 
risks they were assuming threatened them and other firms, and without 
federal assistance many of them would have failed, possibly bringing 
down the financial system.168 
C. The History and Purpose of the PUHCA 
The restructuring of the public utility industry has been called “the 
SEC’s most useful accomplishment,” and also “by far the most difficult 
to attain.”169 The PUHCA was directed at dismantling the public utility 
holding company oligopoly as described in a 101-volume study by the 
 
 162. Id. at 24–26. 
 163. Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 160, at 94 (quoting Ferdinand Pecora, Wall Street 
Under Oath: The Story of Our Modern Money Changers 224–25 (1939)). 
 164. The mega-banks probably are too big and multifaceted to manage. See Grant, supra note 73, 
at 397–410 (describing the size and complexity of Citigroup and Bank of America); see also Ritholtz, 
supra note 102, at 212. 
 165. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates 
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 963, 980–97 (2009). 
 166. See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 82–85. 
 167. See id. at 74–87; Wilmarth, supra note 165, at 1027–35. 
 168. In October 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 
providing $700 million to the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (“TARP”) to buy up toxic assets from 
systemically important financial institutions. See Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). Instead of 
doing so, the government made direct investments into these firms. 
 169. Seligman, supra note 147, at 127. 
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and an investigation by the House 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.170 Subject to state 
regulation, electric and gas utilities were inherently local or regional in 
their operations.171 As a result, these businesses did not posses 
organizational economies of scale on a national basis.172 During the 1920s, 
however, holding companies sought to build giant utility empires by 
purchasing various utility properties around the country. These empires 
grew quickly during the 1930s.173 By 1932, holding companies controlled 
the majority of the electric and gas utilities in the U.S.174 Thirteen large 
groups controlled 75% of the entire privately-owned electric utility 
industry.175 Three holding companies (J.P. Morgan’s United Corporation, 
Samuel Insull’s holding company empire, and the Electric Bond and 
Share Company) generated 45% of the electricity in the United States, 
and four holding companies controlled more than 56% of the natural gas 
transportation system.176 In addition to the power of these holding 
companies over rates, a number of evils in the operation of the holding 
companies provided an impetus for reform.177 
 
 170. See 1 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 230 (3d ed. 1989). 
 171. 6 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 18.1, at 440 (6th ed. 
2009). See generally Bonbright, supra note 161; Martin T. Farris & Roy J. Sampson, Public Utilities: 
Regulation, Management, and Ownership (1973); Martin G. Glaeser, Public Utilities in 
American Capitalism (1957). 
 172. 6 Hazen, supra note 171. See generally Bonbright, supra note 161; Farris & Sampson, supra 
note 171; Glaeser, supra note 171. 
 173. 6 Hazen, supra note 171. See generally Bonbright, supra note 161; Farris & Sampson, supra 
note 171; Glaeser, supra note 171. 
 174. 6 Hazen, supra note 171. See generally Bonbright, supra note 161; Farris & Sampson, supra 
note 171; Glaeser, supra note 171. 
 175. S. Rep. No. 74-621, at 55 (1935). 
 176. Seligman, supra note 147, at 127. In 1939, there were fifty-one separate public utility systems, 
comprising 142 registered holding companies subject to SEC regulation, with aggregate assets in 
excess of $14 billion. 5 SEC Ann. Rep. 63 (1939). In 1986, there were twelve active public utility 
holding companies. 1986 SEC Ann. Rep. 156. These twelve registered holding company systems had 
sixty-five electric or gas utility subsidiaries, seventy-four non-utility subsidiaries, and twenty-two 
inactive subsidiaries. Id. By 1999, the number of public holding companies registered under the Act 
had increased to nineteen. 1999 SEC Ann. Rep. 62. These nineteen “registered systems were 
comprised of 107 public utility subsidiaries, 70 exempt wholesale generators, 216 foreign utility 
companies, 606 non-utility subsidiaries, and 110 inactive subsidiaries, for a total of 1128 companies and 
systems with utility operations in 31 states.” Id. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the 
number of registered publicly utility holding companies grew slowly. As of September 2002, there 
were twenty-eight registered public utility holding company systems and a total of sixty-four public 
utility holding companies. 2002 SEC Ann. Rep. 65. 
 177. Nidhi Thakar, The Urge to Merge: A Look at the Repeal of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 903, 910 (2008). Further, the Roosevelt 
administration was interested in local and government ownership of utilities, and President Roosevelt 
believed that holding companies needed to be eliminated from the public utility business. Id. The 
President viewed holding companies as “private socialism of concentrated private power.” Id.; see also 
Seligman, supra note 147, at 129 (quoting Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, The PUHCA’s 
Gone, What Is Next for Holding Companies?, 27 Energy L.J. 1, 3 (2006)). 
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It was not only the size and geographic breadth of the utilities that 
disturbed policymakers, but also their unsound corporate structures and 
practices.178 Federal regulators found the abuses adversely affected the 
interests of the American public as investors and consumers.179 Among 
the evils uncovered were inflationary write-ups on the books of the 
operating companies, acquisitions of properties at inflated valuations, the 
financing of corporate expansions by issuing excessive amounts of senior 
securities and insufficient amounts of common stock (leading to 
excessive leverage and inequitable capital structures), giving favorable 
treatment to investment bankers, and the extraction of excessive 
dividends and fees.180 A study by the FTC also noted that inappropriate 
partial bargaining between holding companies and their subsidiaries led 
to the imposition of excessive charges upon the operating subsidiaries; 
the allocation of charges from service, management, construction, and 
other contracts among subsidiary public utilities in different states, 
causing problems of regulation for any individual state; the complication 
of state regulation of subsidiaries through the exercise of control over 
subsidiary business policies; the use of inadequate equity investments to 
exert control over operating subsidiaries; and the extension of holding 
company systems without regard to operational, integration, and 
business logistics.181 
Further, the holding company structure led to financial imbalances. 
Control of the utilities was accomplished by leverage, in that the holding 
companies held voting common stock, but the real equity was held by the 
public in the form of nonvoting preferred stock and debt securities.182 
Although this type of leverage made for high valuations during the boom 
of the 1920s, excessive debt-to-equity ratios were the principal cause of 
 
 178. Section 1(b) of the Act sets out some of the abuses: inadequate disclosure to investors of the 
information necessary to appraise the “financial position or earning power” of the holding company; 
the issuance of securities “without the approval or consent of the States having jurisdiction over 
subsidiary public-utility companies”; the issuance of securities “upon the basis of fictitious or unsound 
asset values . . . and upon the basis of paper profits from intercompany transactions, or in anticipation 
of excessive revenues from subsidiary public-utility companies;” and the overcapitalization of 
operating subsidiaries, thus increasing fixed charges and “tend[ing] to prevent voluntary rate 
reductions.” Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, § 1(b), 49 Stat. 803, 803–04 (1935) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (2000)), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 (2005); 
see also 6 Hazen, supra note 171. 
 179. § 1(b), 49 Stat. at 803–04; see also 6 Hazen, supra note 171. 
 180. See 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 170, at 230–31. 
 181. § 1(b), 49 Stat. at 803–04; see also 6 Hazen, supra note 171. The public utility systems became 
complex and overcapitalized systems. 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1, at 441. Often beyond the power 
of any single state regulators, abuse of their complex structures led many holding companies into 
bankruptcies and caused tremendous losses for investors. See 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 86 (1944). 
 182. See 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 170, at 232. 
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the bankruptcies of many utility holding companies during the bust of 
the 1930s.183 
The general purposes of the PUHCA were to strengthen the capital 
structure of holding companies by increasing the ratio of equity to debt,184 
to return control to local regulators and managers, and to improve their 
corporate governance.185 A bitter and prolonged legislative battle 
preceded the enactment of the PUHCA, and after the statute was passed, 
the industry refused to comply.186 The most important public utilities did 
not even register with the SEC but instead tested the constitutionality of 
the legislation.187 However, careful legal maneuvering by the SEC 
avoided a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional, and in time, 
changes in the composition of the Supreme Court made such a 
declaration unlikely.188 Yet, the SEC was not able to fully implement the 
statute until the Truman administration.189 
D. Overview of the PUHCA 
The PUHCA was primarily concerned with regulation rather than 
disclosure. It required all holding companies with subsidiaries engaged in 
the electric utility business or in the retail distribution of natural or 
manufactured gas to register with the SEC.190 Thereafter, the holding 
company became subject to two principal provisions. Section 11 
 
 183. See Seligman, supra note 147, at 128. 
 184. According to the SEC, “a balanced capital structure with a substantial amount of common 
stock equity . . . provides a considerable measure of insurance against bankruptcy[,] enables the utility 
to raise new money most economically, and avoids the possibility of deterioration in service to 
consumers if there is a decline in earnings.” 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 72 (1944). 
 185. 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1, at 441. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 address the securities markets generally and thus were ill-equipped to deal with 
problems peculiar to the public utilities industry. Id. Above and beyond the Acts, the PUHCA was 
intended “to compel the simplification of public-utility holding-company systems . . . .” See § 1(b), 49 
Stat. at 804. The fundamental purpose of the PUHCA was to “free utility operating companies from 
the absentee control of holding companies, thus allowing them to be more effectively regulated by the 
states.” 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1, at 441. According to Hazen, the following sources are 
illustrative: 
North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 704 (1946) (by compelling holding companies to 
“integrate and coordinate their systems and to divest themselves of security holdings of 
geographically and economically unrelated properties . . . Congress hoped to rejuvenate 
local utility management and to restore effective state regulation.”); Alabama Elec. Co-op., 
Inc. v. SEC, 353 F.2d 905, 9 (D.C. Cir.1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 968 (1966) (“The purpose 
of Public Utility Holding Company Act . . . was to supplement state regulation—not to 
supplant it.”). 
6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1, at 441 n.14. 
 186. See Parrish, supra note 146, at 219. 
 187. See id. at 219–20. 
 188. See Seligman, supra note 147, at 132–38. 
 189. Id. at 257. 
 190. § 5, 49 Stat. at 812–14. 
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mandated geographical integration and corporate simplification,191 and 
other sections regulated the financing and operation of the holding 
company system, including transactions with affiliates.192 The SEC’s 
authority to review a holding company’s financial structure included the 
regulation of intercompany loans, the payment of dividends, sale of 
assets, proxy solicitations, and service, sales, and construction 
contracts.193 Very importantly, the SEC approved securities issuances and 
acquisitions according to a merit review regime, in addition to a 
disclosure based review.194 Intracompany transfers were limited. The evil 
of a powerful oligopoly having an undue influence on political policy was 
recognized and controlled. The financial promotion of any candidate for 
public office or the support of any political party was prohibited.195 
The SEC had the authority to determine what constituted a 
“holding company,” “subsidiary,” or “affiliate” subject to the PUHCA.196 
The standard utilized by the SEC was 10% voting stock ownership.197 
Because the main objective of the PUHCA was to achieve a balanced 
capital structure for utilities, the most important provision of the 
PUHCA gave the SEC the power to cause a holding company to 
eliminate more than two tiers of holding companies in any holding 
company complex.198 Further, the SEC could restructure a holding 
company whenever necessary “to ensure that the corporate structure or 
continued existence of any company in the holding company system does 
not unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure, or unfairly or 
inequitably distribute voting power among security holders . . . .”199 
The PUHCA has been described as “the most ambitious legislation 
of the depression-inspired federal attack on concentrated economic 
 
 191. Id. § 11. This section was sometimes called the “death sentence,” because it put an end to the 
holding companies as they previously existed. See Thakar, supra note 177, at 912. 
 192. See §§ 5, 6, 49 Stat. at 812–14; Douglas W. Hawes, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935—Fossil or Foil?, 30 Vand. L. Rev. 605, 608 (1977); see also Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 
U.S. 419, 442–43 (1938) (holding the registration provisions of the PUHCA constitutional); N. Am. 
Co. v. SEC, 133 F.2d 148 (2d Cir.1943), aff’d, 327 U.S. 686 (1946). 
 193. See §§ 12(a)–(e), 13(a), 49 Stat. at 823–25. 
 194. See 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 170, at 240–43. 
 195. Id. at 240–41. 
 196. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. SEC, 166 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948); Phillips v. SEC, 153 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 
1946). 
 197. Blumberg, supra note 151, at 305. This was a much lower number than the concept of control 
in other statutes. For example, the Bank Holding Company Act and the Savings and Loan Holding 
Company Act utilize 25% as the standard, although implementing administrative regulations go down 
to as low as 5% and 10%. Id. 
 198. Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, PUHCA’s Gone: What Is Next for Holding 
Companies?, 27 Energy L.J. 1, 7 (2006). 
 199. Public Utility Holding Company Act, § 11(b)(2), 49 Stat. 803, 821 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79–79(z)-6 (2000)), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–
16463 (2005). 
Karmel_62-HLJ-821 (Do Not Delete) 4/16/2011 1:08 PM 
852 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:821 
power.”200 Although the SEC had the authority to integrate and simplify 
the structure of the holding companies, the agency accomplished the 
restructuring of the utility industry by inducing the utilities to propose 
acceptable divestiture and simplification plans. It did so not only by 
interpreting some provisions of the statute in an uncompromising way 
and litigating its interpretations, but also by utilizing exceptions and 
giving rewards to companies that completed voluntary proceedings.201 
These rewards were to increase the value of both preferred and common 
stock in reorganization proceedings. The financial structure of both 
holding companies and operating companies was strengthened.202 
Although the SEC was forced to compromise with the utilities in order to 
achieve the PUHCA’s objectives, the agency’s geographic integration of 
the utilities and their corporate simplification was “the most 
comprehensive structural relief ever achieved by an agency of the federal 
government. The SEC’s enforcement . . . also was an illustration of the 
advantages of the process.”203 
E. Geographical Integration and Corporate Simplification 
In order to strengthen the capital structures of holding company 
systems and to bring the utilities industry back under the control of local 
management and local regulation, the SEC had to examine the corporate 
structures of holding companies and their subsidiaries.204 The SEC had to 
determine “the extent to which their corporate structures could be 
simplified, or their voting power redistributed, and whether their 
properties and businesses were restricted to those necessary or 
appropriate to the operations of an integrated public utility system.”205 
The PUHCA’s geographical integration provision was its “very heart.”206 
It required that each holding company system be limited to a single 
integrated electric or gas utility system, and to such other businesses as 
were reasonably incidental, or economically necessary or appropriate, to 
the operations of the system.207 The term “integrated public utility 
 
 200. Seligman, supra note 147, at 247 & 794–95 n.22 (quoting Ronald Finlayson, The Public Utility 
Holding Company Under Federal Regulation, J. Bus., July 1946, at 11, 11) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 201. James W. Moeller, Requiem for the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: The “Old” 
Federalism and State Regulation of Inter-State Holding Companies, 17 Energy L.J. 343, 350 (1996); see 
Seligman, supra note 147, at 254. 
 202. Melnyk & Lamb, supra note 198. 
 203. Seligman, supra note 147, at 263. 
 204. See § 11(a), 49 Stat. at 820. 
 205. See 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.4.  
 206. SEC v. New England Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. 176, 180 (1966) (quoting N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 
327 U.S. 686, 704 n.14 (1946)). 
 207. § 11(b)(1), 49 Stat. at 820–21. 
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system” contemplated a group of naturally-related properties within a 
single area or region208 with respect to both electric and gas companies.209 
A single “integrated public utility system” could not include both 
gas and electric properties.210 But a holding company had the right to 
continue to control one or more additional public utility systems, 
whether gas or electric, if the SEC, among other things, found that each 
such additional system could not be operated as an independent system 
without the loss of “substantial economies,”211 and that all such additional 
systems were located in one state or in adjoining states, or in a 
contiguous foreign country.212 As a precondition, the SEC also had to 
find that the continued combination of such systems under the control of 
a single holding company was not so large as to adversely affect the 
advantages of localized management, the efficiency of operations, or the 
effectiveness of regulation. For a holding company to continue control of 
one or more additional integrated public utility systems, all of the above 
conditions would have to be met.213 The retention of an additional 
integrated system was very rare.214 Only if the SEC found that it was 
“necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors or consumers and not detrimental to the proper functioning of 
such system or systems,”215 could a holding company retain an interest in a 
functionally related non-utility business.216 
 
 208. See Nat’l Rural Elec. Co-op. Ass’n v. SEC, 276 F.3d 609, 610–11 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 15 
U.S.C. §§ 79j(c)(1), 79k(b)(1), 79b(a)(29)(A) and vacating the SEC’s decision to approve a merger 
involving two geographically distant companies); see also 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.4. 
 209. See § 2(a)(29), 49 Stat. at 810. 
 210. Phila. Co. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 720, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 8 S.E.C. 
443, 462 (1941). This prohibition of utilities with both gas and electric divisions was later relaxed and 
eventually all but abandoned. See 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.5. 
 211. See § 11(b)(1)(A), 49 Stat. at 820; New England Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. at 179; Phila. Co., 28 
S.E.C. 35, 46 (1948), aff’d sub nom. Phila. Co. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see also City of 
New Orleans v. SEC, 969 F.2d 1163, 1167–68 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 212. § 11(b)(1)(B), 49 Stat. at 820. See Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 936, 941–42 (D.C. 
Cir. 1943) (“[Within an integrated public utility system, all] additional systems [had to be] located in 
the same state with the principal system, or in adjoining states, or in a contiguous foreign country.”), 
vacated as moot, 332 U.S. 788 (1947). 
 213. Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co., 138 F.2d at 941; see also Envtl. Action, Inc. v. SEC, 895 F.2d 1255, 1263 
(9th Cir. 1990); N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 133 F.2d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 1943), aff’d, 327 U.S. 686 (1946). 
 214. New England Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. at 180. 
 215. N. Am. Co., 133 F.2d at 152 (quoting section 11) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co., 138 F.2d at 947. But see Phila. Co., 177 F.2d at 726 (quoting N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 
327 U.S. 686 (1946)).  
 216. For a number of decisions relating such a finding, see Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. SEC, 
170 F.2d 453, 462–63 (8th Cir. 1948) (pipeline construction); Columbia Gas Sys., Public Utility Holding 
Company Act Release No. 35-21895, 21 SEC Docket 1480 (Jan. 23, 1981) (gas by-products); Sys. Fuels 
Inc., Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 21367, 19 SEC Docket 103 (Dec. 28, 1979) 
(uranium); Ohio Power Co., Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 21173, 18 SEC Docket 
15 (Aug. 3, 1979) (railcar repair facilities); Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., Public Utility Holding 
Company Act Release No. 20561, 1978 WL 196975 (May 26, 1978) (lending for purpose of installing 
insulation); New England Elec. Sys., Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 18635, 5 SEC 
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Importantly, the PUHCA also required corporate simplification.217 It 
mandated elimination of corporate layers that complicated the structure of 
the holding company system. The unduly complicated structure caused the 
distribution of voting power among the system’s security holders to be 
unfair or inequitable.218 The SEC was required to take whatever action was 
necessary to ensure that holding companies ceased to be holding 
companies with respect to any subsidiaries having their own subsidiaries 
that were also holding companies.219 However, the SEC could not regulate 
the corporate structure of any company that was not a holding company, 
or whose principal business was that of a public utility operating 
company,220 except to ensure fair and equitable distribution of voting 
power among the shareholders of such a company.221 
An order of the SEC directing a registered holding company to 
simplify its corporate structure was required to be complied with within 
one year.222 If the holding company refused to comply voluntarily, the SEC 
could enforce the order in a U.S. district court.223 Because Congress 
intended for holding company systems to comply with the PUHCA 
voluntarily,224 the SEC’s orders “normally declared only that [a] particular 
holding company or subsidiary . . . reclassify its securities, . . . divest certain 
holdings, or liquidate, without specifying how this was to be 
accomplished.”225 Companies could file their own plan of compliance.226 
Even in reorganization proceedings, the PUHCA was not intended to 
cause forced liquidation of securities.227 
 
Docket 372 (Oct. 30, 1974) (oil and gas exploration); Middle S. Utils., Public Utility Holding Company 
Act Release No. 185547, 5 SEC Docket 102 (Sept. 5, 1974) (refineries); N. Am. Co., 29 S.E.C. 521, 533 
(1949) (coal properties); Cities Servs. Gas Co., 15 S.E.C. 962, 969 (1944) (production and transmission 
facilities); Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co., 12 S.E.C. 41 (1942) (merchandising of appliances). For examples of 
businesses that have not been found to be functionally related, see Pennzoil Co., 43 S.E.C. 709, 719 
(1968) (electrical instruments); N. New England Co., 20 S.E.C. 832, 842–44 (1945) (pulpwood); N. Am. 
Co., 11 S.E.C. 194, 226 (1942) (land development). 
 217. See § 11(b)(2), 49 Stat. at 821. 
 218. See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1946) (noting evidence was 
sufficient to support finding that two subsidiary companies unduly and unnecessarily complicate a 
holding company’s system); Wis.’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. SEC, 882 F.2d 523, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(finding a holding company’s acquisition of a public utility did not unnecessarily complicate corporate 
structure of utility). See generally Leo W. Leary, “Fair and Equitable” Distribution of Voting Power 
Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (1953). 
 219. § 11(b)(2), 49 Stat. at 821.; see, e.g., Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 626 (1945). 
 220. See § 11(b)(2), 49 Stat. at 821. 
 221. 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.1. 
 222. See § 11(c), 49 Stat. at 821. 
 223. Id. § 11(d). 
 224. 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 65 (1944). 
 225. 6 Hazen, supra note 171, § 18.4. 
 226. § 11(e), 49 Stat. at 822. The SEC could approve the plan if it found the plan to be necessary to 
effectuate the provisions of subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected. Id. 
 227. N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 709 (1946); In re Elec. Bond & Share Co., 73 F. Supp. 426, 
449 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). In fact, reorganization plans under section 11(e) frequently provided for 
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In addition to reducing the concentration of economic power in the 
utilities industry, the PUHCA had several beneficial effects upon 
investors, consumers, and utility companies. Operating companies became 
financially stronger and more responsive.228 Investors began to buy 
securities in public utility companies. These investments were more 
accurately valued. Investors began receiving previously unseen dividends 
and other cash payments.229 
F. Continued Operation and Regulation 
Geographical and corporate simplification requirements led many 
holding companies to self-liquidate. But the PUHCA did not intend 
elimination of all holding companies.230 The PUHCA “prescribe[d] 
standards for the continued operation of compact, well-integrated 
systems,” regulated by the SEC.231 The provisions of the PUHCA that 
continued to apply related to the issuance of securities232 and to the 
acquisition of securities, utility assets, and other interests.233 The PUHCA 
also addressed intercompany transactions,234 reporting requirements,235 
and standards for accounting and record keeping.236 In line with other 
federal securities laws, the PUHCA imposed liability for materially 
misleading statements237 and prohibited certain activities by corporate 
insiders, including insider trading.238 
Acquisitions also were regulated.239 The SEC would not approve 
acquisitions of interests in another business if: (1) the acquisition led to 
interlocking relations or a concentration of control that was detrimental 
to investors or consumers,240 (2) the consideration to be paid in connection 
with such acquisition was unreasonable or unfair,241 or (3) the “acquisition 
 
alternative methods of compliance. See 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 65 (1944). The SEC had to evaluate 
whether corporate reorganization plans were fair and equitable. See id. The SEC mainly sought to 
ensure that reorganization did not result in the destruction of values or in the taking of investment 
interest. Id. 
 228. See authorities cited supra note 171. 
 229. See 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 65–66 (1944). 
 230. 15 SEC Ann. Rep. 95 (1949). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, §§ 6, 7, 49 Stat. 803, 814–17 (1935) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (2000)), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451–16463 (2005) 
(requiring a “declaration” containing the types of information required by 1933 Act registration). 
 233. §§ 8–10, 49 Stat. at 817–20. 
 234. Id. §§ 12, 13. 
 235. Id. § 14. 
 236. Id. § 15; see also 17 C.F.R. pt. 256 (2004). 
 237. § 16, 49 Stat. at 829–30. 
 238. Id. § 17. 
 239. Id. § 10. 
 240. Id. § 10(b)(1); see e.g., Tex. Utils. Co., 1 S.E.C. 944, 952 (1936). 
 241. § 10(b)(2), 49 Stat. at 819; see, e.g., Ohio Power Co., 44 S.E.C. 340, 346 (1970) (approving 
acquisition upon finding that the consideration had fair relation to the sums invested or the earnings 
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[would] unduly complicate the capital structure of the holding company 
system . . . or [would] be detrimental to the public interest or the interest 
of investors or consumers or the proper functioning of such holding-
company system.”242 The SEC had to make specific findings that the 
transaction would “serve the public interest by tending towards the 
economical and the efficient development of an integrated public-utility 
system.”243 
By the end of the century, many holding companies244 operated 
under exemptions from registration that continued “unless and except” 
the SEC found the exemption detrimental to the public interest or to the 
interest of investors or consumers.245 Thus, exempt holding companies 
were indirectly regulated by the exemption, as they risked losing the 
exemption if they purchased a significant nonutility business not 
functionally related to the operation of the utility system.246 
The PUHCA had subjected an entire industry sector to close 
scrutiny by a federal regulator. This was an unprecedented and successful 
experiment in America’s economic history. While the PUHCA solution 
may be viewed as a product of its time, it worked effectively, and there is 
no reason a similar approach could not work again. This Article 
hypothesizes that certain aspects of the PUHCA model, for example a 
version of the corporate simplification framework, could be transplanted 
and utilized in an industry, such as financial mega-conglomerates, whose 
condition and symptoms resemble those that plagued the public utilities 
in 1930s. 
G. How a PUHCA Solution Could Be Applied to the Banks 
The New Deal regulatory response to the problems of banking was 
similar in many respects to the New Deal regulatory response to public 
utility and common carrier regulation: “The essential features of [these 
regulatory systems] were entry control, price control, market allocation 
through the forced separation of commercial banking from investment 
banking and securities activities, and close supervision of investments 
 
capacity of the properties and that the amount was arrived at after arm’s length bargaining); see also 
6 Hazen, supra note 171. 
 242. § 10(b)(3), 49 Stat. at 819; see, e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 10 S.E.C. 1091, 1091 (1942). 
 243. § 10(c)(2), 49 Stat. at 819; Am. Gas & Elec. Co., 22 S.E.C. 808, 810 (1946); see, e.g., Envtl. 
Action, Inc. v. SEC, 895 F.2d 1255, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding the SEC’s approval of an asset 
acquisition in the face of a challenge by retail customers of one of the holding company’s subsidiaries). 
 244. 1993 SEC Ann. Rep. 44. In 1986, there were thirteen registered holding companies. 1986 SEC 
Ann. Rep. 156. 
 245.  Brian C. Elmer & Mark E. Mazo, Utility Takeovers and the Holding Company Act, Pub. 
Util. Fort., Sept. 30, 1982, at 17, 17. Ninety-one holding companies had exemptions from registration 
as of June 1982. Id. 
 246. See H.R. Rep. No. 1318, at 14–15 (1935); see also authorities cited supra note 171. 
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and related activities.”247 One significant difference was the creation of 
the FDIC.248 Although FDIC insurance undoubtedly prevented bank 
runs and assured the stability of banks for a long period of time, it also 
led to the too-big-to-fail principle that is now so questionable and 
controversial. The need to protect the deposit insurance fund also led to 
the creation of mega-banks. 
It is not possible to go back to the economy of the 1930s, and the 
New Deal philosophy of protecting business through regulations that 
proved anti-competitive was discredited during the deregulatory decades 
of 1980 to 2010. Perhaps, however, in the aftermath of the financial 
meltdown of 2008, it is time to discredit the ideology of deregulation and 
return to some of the ideas of the 1930s. Uncontrolled competition in 
free markets led to the collapse of the financial system and enormous 
destruction in the real economy. The problems of the decade from 2000 
to 2010, like the problems of the 1920s, were too much leverage in the 
financial system, too much complexity in the banking and investment 
banking systems, and the creation of holding company structures that 
proved unmanageable.249 Furthermore, despite all of the financial 
regulation that continued to exist, functional regulation meant that no 
agency had regulatory oversight and control over subsidiaries of holding 
companies that sheltered off-balance sheet liabilities and threatened the 
viability of their parents and regulated entities. Legislation that would 
rationalize holding company structures, and make these organizations 
simpler and more transparent could therefore be of value. 
A statute, analogous to the PUHCA, that rationalizes the corporate 
structure and operations of the financial services industry and eliminates 
conflicts of interest between banking and other activities would be a 
novel but effective antidote to the functional regulation that sowed the 
seeds for the financial crisis of 2008. Although the Fed will now have 
oversight of systemically significant institutions and a council composed 
of all of the financial regulators, headed by the Treasury, will be 
formed,250 Dodd-Frank sets forth no comprehensive plan for controlling 
the size or complexity of the mega-banks. Some new ideas for curtailing 
risk through corporate structural reform were considered by Congress in 
the 2010 financial reform debates—specifically, concentration and 
growth limits for systemically important firms, moving derivatives trading 
to subsidiaries, and the Volcker Rule.251 Unfortunately, these ideas have 
 
 247. Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 Va. L. 
Rev. 301, 303 (1987). 
 248. Id. at 302–03. 
 249. See John Kay, We Should All Have a Say in How Banks Are Reformed, Fin. Times, June 16, 
2010, at 13. 
 250. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1002, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955–64 (2010). 
 251. See Sewell Chan, Financial Debate Renews Scrutiny on Size of Banks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 
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been watered down to the point where they may not be a meaningful 
curb on risky activities by the largest banks or prevent further 
concentration in the financial sphere. 
Under Dodd-Frank, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the 
“Council”) is required to identify systemically important nonbank 
financial companies252 and then to make recommendations to the Fed 
concerning the establishment of prudential standards and reporting and 
disclosure requirements.253 Bank holding companies with $50 billion or 
more in assets are automatically subject to enhanced prudential 
standards.254 Large investment-banking holding companies will be subject 
to Fed supervision.255 If the Fed finds a systemically important company 
poses a grave threat to financial stability, with the approval of two-thirds 
of the members of the Council, the Fed must take action to mitigate the 
risk.256 Such action could include limiting the ability of the company to 
merge with or otherwise become affiliated with another company, 
restricting offers of a financial product, ordering termination of activities 
or imposing restrictions on such activities, or requiring the company to 
sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-balance sheet items to unaffiliated 
entities.257 
More drastic curtailment of concentration and growth limits has 
been left either to studies or to future Fed rulemaking. Six months after 
the passage of Dodd-Frank, the Council must complete a study on the 
prohibition on acquisitions by firms where the total assets of the resulting 
company would exceed 10% of aggregate U.S. liabilities.258 Within nine 
months of the Council’s study, the Fed must issue rules limiting merger 
and acquisition transactions that would result in a company holding 
greater than 10% of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial 
companies.259 The Fed is instructed to issue concentration limits for large 
interconnected bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in 
 
2010, at A-1; John Gapper, Volcker Has the Measure of the Banks, Fin. Times, Jan. 28, 2010, at 15; 
Gretchen Morgenson, Do You Have Any Reforms in Size XL?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2010, (Sunday 
Business), at 1; Paul Volcker, How to Reform Our Financial System, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 2010, 
(Sunday Opinion), at 11. 
 252. Nonbank financial companies are any company other than a bank holding company 
predominantly engaged in financial activities, which means that 85% or more of the company’s and its 
subsidiaries’ consolidated annual gross revenues or consolidated total assets are attributable to 
activities that are financial in nature. § 102(a)(4)(B), (a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1391–92. 
 253. Id. § 112(a)(2)(I). 
 254. Id. § 165(a)(1)(A). 
 255. Id. § 113(a)(1), (b)(1). During the 2008 crisis, the largest broker-dealer holding companies 
were either acquired by banks or became bank holding companies. See supra note 129 and 
accompanying text. 
 256. § 121(a), 124 Stat. at 1410–11. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. sec. 622, § 14(b), (e). 
 259. Id. sec. 622, § 14(e). 
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assets and for systemically important nonbank financial companies.260 
Among other things, these rules must prohibit such companies from 
having credit exposure to any unaffiliated company that exceeds 25% of 
the capital stock and surplus of the company.261 
The Volcker Rule prohibits any “banking entity”262 from 
“engag[ing] in proprietary trading[,] . . . or acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any 
equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a 
hedge fund or private equity fund.”263 In the course of the negotiations 
for this legislation, the Volcker Rule became subject to many exceptions, 
including purchases or sales of any security in connection with 
underwriting or market-making activities, risk-mitigating hedging 
activities, and purchases or sales of any security or other instrument on 
behalf of customers.264 Further, a bank may sponsor a private equity or 
hedge fund under certain conditions and maintain a 3% interest in the 
fund.265 As initially proposed, the Volcker Rule was designed to control 
the conflicts of interest and risk generated by the trading activities of 
banks that led to the meltdown. It was viewed by its proponent as a mini-
Glass-Steagall.266 Dodd-Frank, as enacted, does not really accomplish this 
task. The Council is directed within six months after the enactment of 
Dodd-Frank to complete a study and make recommendations to 
implement the Volcker Rule,267 but it can be anticipated that the same 
lobbying activities that led to the watering down of the Rule will occur in 
this process.268 
A proposal to force all banks to conduct derivatives trading in a 
subsidiary was considered when the legislation was under consideration,269 
 
 260. Id. § 165(a). 
 261. See id. § 165(e)(2). 
 262. “Banking entity” is defined as any insured depository institution, any company that controls 
such an institution, or any company that is treated as a bank holding company under the International 
Banking Act. Id. sec. 619, § 13(h)(1). 
 263. Id. sec. 619, § 13(a)(1). 
 264. Id. sec. 619(d), § 13(d). 
 265. See id. It is uncertain how rigorously this provision will be enforced or whether banks will 
believe they need to come to the rescue of a hedge fund sold to their customers that gets into financial 
difficulty. The decision by Bear Stearns to financially support two hedge funds that it had sponsored 
was the beginning of that firm’s death spiral. See William D. Cohan, House of Cards 362–71 (2009). 
This is the gist of the problem in the regulation of holding company subsidiaries. Instead of serving as 
a source of strength, they have served to seriously weaken their parents. See supra notes 12 & 18 and 
notes 100–03 and accompanying text (regarding Continental Illinois’ problems during the 1987 stock 
market crash). 
 266. Louis Uchitelle, Volcker, Loud and Clear, N.Y. Times, July 11, 2010, (Sunday Business), at 1. 
 267. Sec. 619, § 13(d)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1623. 
 268. See Daniel Indiviglio, 5 Ways Lobbyists Influenced the Dodd-Frank Bill, Atlantic (July 
5, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/07/5-ways-lobbyists-influenced-the-dodd-frank-
bill/59137/; Aaron Lucchetti & Jenny Strasburg, What’s a “Prop” Trader Now?, Wall St. J., July 6, 
2010, at C1. 
 269. See Letter from Thomas Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, to Senator 
Blanche Lincoln, Sen. of Ark. (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/10/ 
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but the final version of Dodd-Frank is not as draconian as initially 
envisioned. Nevertheless, two of the mega-banks have exited from 
derivatives proprietary trading in response to Dodd-Frank.270 There is a 
push out of swap dealers and major swap participants from banks, but 
these provisions do not apply to an insured depository institution 
engaged in hedging or risk mitigation activities directly related to its 
business.271 Moreover, the statute expressly permits an insured depository 
institution to enter into swaps involving rates, currencies, or any other 
assets that are permissible investments for national banks, including 
investment grade certificates of deposit.272 Additionally, any bank or 
bank holding company is prohibited from becoming a swaps entity 
except in compliance with standards to be set by its prudential 
regulator,273 unless such activities are conducted by a bank affiliate 
supervised by the Fed.274 
Whether risky trading or other activities are conducted in a bank or 
in the subsidiary of a financial holding company is not the real issue. If 
the subsidiary is hiding the liabilities of the parent, or is out of control in 
terms of risk, the parent will be punished by the market if the subsidiary 
fails. Although Congress can prohibit the use of federal funds to save the 
subsidiary, the reality of the marketplace is that such a mandate does not 
matter.275 Although appropriate capital charges can mitigate this type of 
risk, the only way to assure that a holding company subsidiary does not 
sink the parent is to spin off the subsidiary. Alternatively, subsidiaries 
engaged in risky businesses can be relegated to organizations which do 
not have deposit or other similar government insurance. 
Although securities firms enjoy insurance from the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation for customer funds and securities in the 
safekeeping of the firms, they are not allowed to use these customer 
assets as capital in the conduct of their business. Rather, such assets are 
segregated.276 Therefore, when Drexel Burnham Lambert failed in 1990, 
 
thomas-hoenig-derivatives-banks_n_608297.html; see also Edward Wyatt, In Tough Stance, Democrat 
Finds Few Allies, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2010, at A16. 
 270. See Jerry A. DiColo, With Big Banks Forced to Exit, Look for Speculators to Step In, Wall 
St. J., Sept. 7, 2010, at C10. 
 271. § 716(d), 124 Stat. at 1648–49. 
 272. Id. § 716(d)(2). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at § 716(c). 
 275. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
 276. In 1970, to compliment SIPC, the SEC enacted Rule 15c3-3, “to ease the particular tracing 
requirements of prior law so as to expand the definition of specifically identifiable property which 
remains outside the single and separate fund and is ‘reclaimable’ by customers in kind.” 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.15c3-3 (2010). Pursuant to the rule, 
[A] broker-dealer must have possession or control of all fully-paid or excess margin 
securities held for the account of customers, and determine daily that it is in compliance 
with this requirement. The broker-dealer must also make periodic computations to 
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no customer funds or securities were lost, and the parent went into 
bankruptcy.277 “The 152 year-old [firm] with 5,300 employees and $3.6 
billion in assets” was at the center of the debt-propelled takeover market 
of the 1980s.278 Nevertheless, “[i]n Washington the Government’s top 
economic team stood by with folded arms and watched the company 
fail.”279 Further, “[w]hile Congress [was] eager to investigate debacles 
like Drexel’s, it [showed] little interest in enacting new laws to curb 
financial markets, even after the 1987 crash.”280 
Twenty years later, partly as a result of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, banks 
and investment banks had numerous subsidiaries in a wide variety of 
businesses, as did American International Group (“AIG”), an insurance 
holding company. It was not the business of banking that brought these 
firms to the brink of collapse. Rather, it was trading bets on and 
investments in securitized subprime mortgages and derivatives, including 
credit default swaps. Many of these businesses were conducted in non-
banking subsidiaries.281 The holding company parent was not properly 
supervised, and subsidiaries with very risky businesses were allowed to 
operate under the umbrella of firms with federal deposit insurance. Even 
worse, the federal financial regulators decided that the mega-firms were 
so interconnected that even an organization like AIG, which was 
essentially an insurance company, had to be bailed out.282 Mega-banks 
strongly opposed pushing out derivatives to subsidiaries—as proposed in 
early versions of Dodd-Frank—because such a move requires devoting 
more capital to those businesses. However, even this regulatory change is 
insufficient to prevent the kind of problems that led to the 2008 
meltdown. The problem in 2008, as in 1987, was excessive leverage. The 
concentration and complexity of the mega-banks simply made matters 
 
determine how much money it is holding that is either customer money or obtained from 
the use of customer securities. If this amount exceeds the amount that it is owed by 
customers or by other broker-dealers relating to customer transactions, the broker-dealer 
must deposit the excess into a special reserve bank account for the exclusive benefit of 
customers. This rule thus prevents a broker-dealer from using customer funds to finance its 
business. 
Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 2008), http://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm. 
 277. Kurt Eichenwald, Drexel, Symbol of Wall St. Era, Is Dismantling; Bankruptcy Filed, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 14, 1990, at A1. 
 278. John Greenwald, Predator’s Fall: Drexel Burnham Lambert, Time, Feb. 26, 1990, at 46, 46. 
 279. Id. at 50. 
 280. Id. 
 281. The AIG unit that was at the center of the financial crisis was an unregulated subsidiary of an 
insurance holding company. See Sorkin, supra note 131, at 154–55, 160, 394–95. 
 282. AIG did own a trust company subsidiary, and so it was overseen by the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, the one regulator that will be eliminated in Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521–23 (2010). 
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worse, so that the government’s top economic team no longer believed it 
could stand by and watch firms fail. 
Conclusion 
Much of the implementation of Dodd-Frank has been left to the 
various functional regulators of financial institutions, and some of the 
more controversial proposed provisions have been relegated to studies. 
While the statute has many salutary provisions and is clearly an 
improvement over the existing regulatory system in many respects, it 
does not change the balkanized nature of the financial regulatory 
universe. Neither does it curtail the leverage inherent in derivatives 
trading.283 Further, it does not reduce the size or complexity of the 
existing mega-banks. Thus far, there has been no political will to 
radically change the regulatory system or the composition of the banking 
industry. This is not surprising, since many of the same players who 
engaged in the deregulatory policies of the last three decades are still in 
power.284 Another financial crisis, a prolonged recession, or changing 
political ideologies could cause a reexamination of the status quo and 
lead to decisions to break up the big banks. If that should happen, 
policymakers could well take another look at the PUHCA as model for 
doing so. 
Since 1980, policymakers have believed that government regulation 
is problematic, free market competition is an unquestioned good, 
financial engineering should be encouraged, and we need not worry if 
financial enterprise eclipses industrial enterprise. These mantras are now 
being reconsidered. This reconsideration should lead to a more 
responsible balance between government, finance, and industry, but the 
poisonous partisanship that has prevailed in Washington in recent years 
does not give much hope of a sensible resolution of the country’s 
economic problems. Dodd-Frank, despite its length and complexity, 
should serve as only the beginning to financial regulatory reform. Yet, in 
view of the intense opposition of the financial industry and the political 
theatrics of an election year, it is surprising that any reform legislation 
was enacted at all. 
Financial regulators have now been tasked with conducting 
hundreds of studies and adopting myriad rules to implement Dodd-
Frank. Will they cooperate or engage in further turf battles? In their 
efforts to avoid further bailouts of too-big-to-fail financial organizations, 
 
 283. I have previously criticized the unwillingness of financial regulators to deal with the excessive 
leverage derivatives have injected into the financial markets. Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, 
Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 909, 935–41 (2005); see also 1987 
Market Break, supra note 15, at 3-19 to 3-22. 
 284. Johnson & Kwak, supra note 11, at 208. 
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will they work to make the mega-banks smaller, less opaque, and less 
complex? At one time, evasion of financial regulation was considered 
wrong, but during the deregulatory push of the last three decades, 
mechanisms to evade statutory and regulatory restraints on financial 
institutions were invented by clever bankers and their lawyers and 
sanctioned by financial regulators. One of the by-products of overly 
complex business and legal systems, this unhealthy syndrome of finding 
ways around laws and regulations should be discredited and changed.285 
Dodd-Frank is a continuation of such prolix complexity. Will financial 
regulators be sufficiently strong and statesman-like to avoid even more 
complicated regulations as they implement this legislation? 
Financial crises have always followed similar patterns. Excessive 
leverage and speculation blow up a financial bubble that eventually 
bursts. The bigger the bubble, the greater the wreckage when the party 
ends. Ordinary Americans have lost their jobs, their homes, and their 
savings. It is not surprising that they increasingly distrust the elites in 
Washington and on Wall Street that cooperated in creating the biggest 
bubble and the greatest bust since the 1920s and 1930s. It is going to take 
much more dramatic and radical action to restore the public’s confidence 
in the government and in the capital markets than Dodd-Frank has 
accomplished. While a twenty-first century New Deal may not be the 
answer to today’s problems, it is at least worth considering which New 
Deal statutes did accomplish good goals and how these accomplishments 
were achieved. The PUHCA was one of those statutes. 
Let me end on a cautionary note, however. The PUHCA remained 
on the books long after its goals were accomplished. I was a 
Commissioner of the SEC during the Three Mile Island disaster,286 and 
one of my concerns was whether the PUHCA was in any way responsible 
for the problems of Three Mile Island. It is quite possible that the 
electrical utility industry had become too stodgy, and too entrenched, in 
part because of the PUHCA. Furthermore, it is possible that nuclear 
power plants like Three Mile Island were starved of necessary capital 
because utilities were unable to grow sufficiently to raise the amounts of 
capital needed in an economy more complicated than that of the 1930s. 
Furthermore, the idea that there should be a market in electrical utility 
production and the growth and implosion of Enron might have been one 
 
 285. See Patrick Jenkins, Banks Seek to Exploit New Rules, Fin. Times, Apr. 12, 2010, at 17. 
 286. On March 28, 1979, the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in 
Middletown, Pennsylvania was the most serious nuclear power plant accident in American history. 
This generating station was constructed by General Public Utilities Corporation (later renamed GPU 
Incorporated), a public utility holding company registered with the SEC. See Fact Sheet, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident (Aug. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html; see also Gerald Huesken, Jr., 
The Legacy of Three Mile Island, Examiner.com (Dec. 2, 2010, 8;13 PM), http://www.examiner.com/ 
history-in-harrisburg/the-legacy-of-three-mile-island. 
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unwelcome side effect of the continuation of the PUHCA beyond the 
time when it should have been sunset. 
Accordingly, while I believe that the mega-banks need to be broken 
up and rationalized, and that deposit insurance and other government 
guarantees should not be allowed to support activities that are not part of 
the function of intermediation, any antitrust type of effort to reduce 
banks to a manageable size should not continue indefinitely. The capital 
markets are always in a state of flux, and we should aim to tame but not 
destroy the creative forces that drive the economy’s engine. 
Nevertheless, the continued uncontrolled growth of a leveraged trading 
culture inside the banking system is a prescription for further financial 
volatility and turmoil that will not have a happy ending. 
